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Abstract
Examination of empirical research confirmed that climate change is a complex problem
of anthropological origin and revealed the need for a management framework to facilitate
strategic decisions aimed at mitigating a rise in global temperatures of 2°C linked to
irresponsible and unsustainable business practices. The purpose of this simulation study
was to develop a management framework of resilience, robustness, sustainability, and
adaptive-capacity (RRSA) for organizations viewed as complex systems to address the
current unsustainable state. As such, the evolutionary-RRSA prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
simulation was developed using an evolutionary game theory approach to agent based
modeling and simulation, to generate data. Regression analyses tested the relationships
between organizational resilience (x1), robustness (x2), and sustainability (x3) as
independent variables, and the dependent variable of adaptive capacity (y) for
cooperative and defective strategies. The findings were that complex nonlinear
relationships exist between resilience, robustness, sustainability, and adaptive-capacity,
which is sensitive to initial conditions and may emerge and evolve from combinations of
cooperative and defective decisions within the evolutionary RRSA PD management tool.
This study resulted in the RRSA management framework, a cyclical 4-phased approach,
which may be used by climate governance leaders, negotiators, and policy-makers to
facilitate strategy to move global climate change policy forward by guiding bottom-up
consumption and production of GHGs, thereby improving adaptive-capacity, while
mitigating an increase in global temperatures of 2°C, which in turn would improve global
socio-economic conditions.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
While Cartesian reductionism dominated scientific inquiry from its birth in the
1600s until the late 19th century, current tools offered by science are not adequate for
understanding complex systems such as living organisms, diseases, the human brain and
immune system, computational intelligence, and consciousness in their entirety (Midgley,
2003). Similarly, climate change falls within the ambit of complex systems not
adequately explained via reductionism. Emergent in nature, the phenomenon of climate
change is different from the sum of its parts, arising from a plethora of human activities.
Not negating the natural contribution of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, the anthropological contribution outweighs the latter; with up to 75% of
emissions deriving from cities (Bulkeley, 2010), anthropogenic activities are considered
the fundamental driver of climate change (Stocker, 2014; Tosun & Schoenefeld, 2017).
From this perspective, it is pertinent and critical to understand the role of organizations as
representing the pinnacle form of anthropological complexity and the role of governance
as representing the pinnacle form of managerial leadership in mitigating the emergence of
climate change and its deleterious consequences. Consequently, a much-needed
framework for management and leadership was derived based on the hypothesis that a
positive relationship exists between resilience, robustness, sustainability (RRS) and
adaptive capacity for cooperative climate governance structures.
This chapter includes the background of the study, the problem, and purpose
statements. Additionally, the research question and hypotheses are presented followed by
the theoretical foundation. Thereafter the nature of the study is discussed, and definitions
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of variables, key terms, as well as the main assumptions of the study are presented.
Consequently, the scope, delimitations, scope, and limitations are discussed. This chapter
includes the significance of the study, and the study’s significance to theory, practice, and
social change, concluding a summary and transition to Chapter 2.
Background of the Study
Descartes developed the Cartesian coordinate system in the early 17th century,
which informed the dominating scientific view of Cartesian reductionism, scientific
reductionism, or hard science, an approach to understanding problems and/or systems in
terms of their constituent parts, which served as the dominant paradigm of scientific
inquiry from its inception until the late 19th century. Through the lens of reductionism,
systems including the biological body are viewed as machines, with the mind being
separate, constituting the Cartesian dualistic machine metaphor view of mind/body,
which is still adopted by many today. While simple systems are adequately understood
through the lens of Cartesian reductionism; for example, it is possible to understand how
a clock works by examining its individual cogs, springs, and other parts, which when
assembled enable the clock to function as a machine as expected; the clock does not
exhibit any unexpected behavior. However, the same cannot be said for a frog. The parts
of a frog do not explain why it may choose to sit on a lily pad one day and a rock on
another day; the frog unlike the clock is unpredictable; there is something extra or
emergent in the behavior of the said frog. The frog cannot be completely understood in
terms of its parts, representing one of a multitude of complex problems unanswered by
reductionism. The latter became less appealing as the dominant scientific paradigm in the
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20th century as a result of its inadequacy to address complex problems and systems such
as economies, insect colonies, climate change, the world wide web, adaptation by living
organisms and diseases, the human brain and immune system, computational intelligence,
and understanding consciousness. In response to this inadequacy, the counter-reductionist
view that the whole is greater than or different from the sum of its parts, capable of
adaptation, emerged with the advent of systems, chaos and network theories.
Institutionally, the Santa Fe Institute was founded in 1984 for the study of complex
systems, viewed as an interdisciplinary field of research.
Complex systems such as human civilizations and social insects exhibit common
properties such as complex collective behavior, signal and information processing such as
optic flow matching in bees (Klein, Cabirol, Devaud, Barron, & Lihoreau, 2017), and
adaptation such as various species acquiring additional physical or behavioral traits better
suited to their environments. Posed as a solution to the questions unanswered by
reductionism, complexity science requires methods and means of quantitative
measurement, in addition to the qualitative descriptions of complexity discussed above.
Examination of the quantitative nature of complexity in the literature reveals that no
single theory of complexity exists; instead, complexity might be quantitatively described
using dynamical systems theory, chaos theory, information theory, and prediction
(Mitchell, 2009).
Holland (1992) articulated that the common properties or universal features of
complex systems were significant enough to group them collectively under the rubric of
complex adaptive systems (CASs). Holland argued that the common principles of CASs,
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which are discussed in the theoretical foundation section of Chapter 2, provide a
structural foundation for the development of computation-based models that could
potentially inform decision-making to address critical leadership problems. Influentially,
Holland’s work emphasized the role of computational models in understanding CASs and
assisting experts, despite their potential lack of expertise in the field of computer science,
to formulate decisions.
Manson, Sun, and Bonsal (2012) articulated that complexity theory provides a
common language or rubric for examining complex systems, specifically with the use of
agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS). Thus, by complexity theory providing the
necessary conceptual foundation for modeling and ABMS affording researchers the tools
to represent complex systems in less rhetorical ways, the relationship between ABMS
and complexity is mutually beneficial (Manson et al., 2012). Moreover, the intersection
between complexity and ABMS is applicable to a wide range of disciplines including
policy fields, natural sciences, and social sciences, enabling the shift between theoretical
and empirical research over multiple scales, such as cells in a living organism to the
movement of galaxies, the management of information systems within organizations, and
beyond (Manson et al., 2012).
Dynamical systems theory provides tools and methods for quantitatively
describing and predicting how CASs behave, work, and change over time in general
terms (Levin et al., 2013; Weaver, 1948). The use of dynamical systems theory is not
applicable to nonchaotic CASs. Dooley and Van de Ven (1999) and Guastello (2013)
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provided a complex systems dynamical perspective of organization, supporting the view
that complex networked organizations might be sensitive to initial conditions.
Central to the study of CASs is network theory, which enables understanding
structure and consequent function, ranging from how to control epidemics and manage
large organizations to the preservation of endangered species. Resilience is a functional
advantage of the scale-free network structure of CASs that display power law
distributions (Barabasi, 2014). Hofstadter (as cited in Mitchell, 2009) discussed
robustness, efficiency, and evolvability as advantages of the networked structure of
CASs, the architecture of which is fine-grained, with the simple components of the
system working together in a highly parallel manner, and providing the capability of
parallel terraced scans or multiple simultaneous searches of several pathways as
displayed by ant colonies (Rehling & Hofstadter, 1997). Redundancy is an important
feature of fine-grained systems in that it allows for processing of statistical information in
organizations as CASs and their consequential resilience to emergent perturbations such
as climate change (Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2012). Redundancy allows for the
rendering of actions as consequential only when taken by numerous components, thereby
guiding the design of robust systems in the form of degeneracy, which is the partial
redundancy of functions or capabilities of components in a system (Whitacre & Bender,
2010).
Closely linked to complexity theory is evolutionary game theory, which as a key
foundational tool of decision-sciences provides valuable sagacity into the emergence and
sustainability of cooperation at various levels of organization (Axelrod, 1984). The N-

6
Person Prisoner’s Dilemma Public Goods Game (NPD PGG) has specifically been
discussed and studied at length in the literature following Axelrod’s finding that the Titfor-Tat (TfT) strategy outperformed all other strategies for achieving reciprocal altruism.
The NPD as an archetypal PGG involves N number of players consisting of cooperators
(C) and defectors (D). The cooperators contribute to the cost c of a public good, whereas
the defectors do not. The NPD is played by giving all participants a chance to cooperate
and contribute to c, and at the end of a round, the total contribution is divided equally
among all players after being multiplied by an incentive factor I (Pacheco, Santos, Souza,
& Skyrms, 2009). Hence, the free-riding problem emerges, which involves Ds benefiting
from the efforts of Cs while simultaneously defecting (Bulkeley & Newell, 2015). In
other words, if there were m number of contributors, then the defectors get the
contribution mIc/N, whereas the contributors only get mIc/N – c. Ergo in heterogeneous
groups the defectors always win. Thus, the NPD has significance as a means of
understanding the decision dynamics associated with climate change negotiations, as
climate change is viewed as a tragedy of the commons problem in the literature, which is
approached using various types of PGG game theories, the most predominant being NPD
(Bulkeley & Newell, 2015; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990).
Synthesis of the literature on dynamical processes in CASs reveals that
sociotechnical systems such as organizations display the information processing and
computational optimization processes of dynamical systems (Vespignani, 2012).
However, there is a need for a conceptual management framework, based on the models
of evolutionary game theory and dynamical systems presented in the current literature
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that guides the prediction and control of organizational dynamical processes. I addressed
this gap by demonstrating that organizations are sensitive to initial conditions, using
evolutionary game theory characteristics to model agents as organizations (state, private,
transnational, and community), and tested four types of climate governance structures
using evolutionary PD. A management framework for resilience, robustness, and
sustainability (RRS) was developed in this study.
Problem Statement
Empirical research clearly confirms that climate change and global warming are
complex wicked problems of anthropological origin (Barnes et al., 2013). These
problems consist of multiple levels of sociopolitical, socioeconomic (Berkhout, 2012),
and socioecological subproblems linked to irresponsible and unsustainable business
practices, industrialized farming, speciesism, extinction, and the use of fossil fuels for
transportation and energy generation (Hall & Vredenburg, 2012) to name a few. As
organizations constitute some of the largest complex human systems, the anthropological
contribution of organizations to global warming and climate change must be examined
and understood to develop solutions for the problems stemming from the lack of adaptive
capacity to climate change (Moore, 2012). Furthermore, scholars have theorized that
organizations constitute complex evolutionary and networked organisms (see Mitchell,
2009); however, scientific literature points to a lacuna or gap for a framework to
understand the role of organizations, specifically within the context of information
systems management, in mitigating climate change and global warming. Therefore, the
specific problem was the lack of a management decision framework for increasing
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adaptive capacity to climate change via the mechanisms RRS, which facilitate the
improvement of climate governance strategies.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative computational experimental study was to develop
a management decision framework of resilience, robustness, sustainability, and adaptive
capacity (RRSA) for climate governance organizations (state, private, transnational, and
community) viewed as complex evolutionary systems to transcend the current
unsustainable state. Thus, I tested the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists
between organizational resilience, defined as the amplitude of organizational deviation
tolerance possible, before returning to an expected output level. Robustness was defined
as the measure of organizational deviation from an expected outcome due to perturbation;
sustainability was defined as the length of time (number of time steps) the system is able
to remain resilient; and adaptive capacity was defined as the quantitative increase in
complicated dynamics, emergent self-organized behavior, and information processing
ability for cooperative climate governance decisions, else for defective decisions, the
relationship between the variables is negative for evolutionary-RRSA, evolutionary-TfT,
cooperate, and defect PD games. The objective was to relate the evolutionary traits of
resilience, robustness, and sustainability (independent variables) to the adaptive capacity
(dependent variable) of organizations using an originally developed evolutionary PD
simulation in Netlogo and statistical variable-based modeling in Excel. The evolutionary
game theory rules of PD have been adapted for this study to understand the complex
dynamics of RRSA embedded in climate change decision-making structures that either
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limit or facilitate adaptive capacity. The independent variables of resilience, robustness,
and sustainability were defined in evolutionary game theory terms for the purpose of this
study. The dependent variable of adaptive capacity was defined as the quantitative
increase in adaptive behaviors agents in NetLogo, (i.e., a quantitative increase in
complicated dynamics, emergent self-organized behavior, and information processing
ability).
This study may provide insight into a lacuna in the current literature on
understanding the relationship between organizational resilience, robustness,
sustainability, and organizational adaptability, from a complex evolutionary systems
perspective using a quantitative strategy of inquiry. Greater knowledge of this
relationship may be used to facilitate strategic management and decision making in
addition to moving policy forward in a positive socioeconomic manner. Furthermore, this
study has implications for the objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) concerning the adaptation of developing countries to
climate change and the devastating effects of noncompliance if global policy, as indeed a
function of management and decision making does not move forward in a positive
manner.
Research Question and Hypotheses
Research question: What is the relationship (linear, superlinear, sublinear, power
law, or other) between organizational resilience (x1), robustness (x2), and sustainability
(x3) and adaptive capacity (Xt+1) for cooperative and defective climate governance
strategies?
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Null hypothesis (H0): There is no relationship between the independent variables
of organizational resilience, robustness, and sustainability as integral components of
complex evolutionary systems, and adaptive capacity (dependent variable) for
cooperative and defective climate governance decisions that constitute PD strategies.
Alternate hypothesis (H1): A relationship exists between the independent
variables of organizational resilience, robustness, and sustainability as integral
components of complex evolutionary systems, and adaptive capacity (dependent variable)
for cooperative strategies of climate governance involved in PD strategies.
Alternate hypothesis (H2): A negative relationship exists between the independent
variables of organizational resilience, robustness, and sustainability as integral
components of complex evolutionary systems, and adaptive capacity (dependent variable)
for defective decisions of climate governance involved in PD strategies.
Alternate hypothesis (H3): Organizations represent dynamical complex adaptive
systems that display sensitive dependence to initial conditions.
Using evolutionary game theory dynamics, I examined the relationship between
organizational resilience, robustness, sustainability, and adaptive capacity. The boundary
limitations for this model were set quantitatively by using agents to represent climate
government organizations. Specifically, ABMS using an originally developed
evolutionary PD simulation on the NetLogo platform in combination with statistical
modeling in Excel was used.
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Theoretical Foundation
Evolutionary game theory, specifically N-Person PD (Axelrod, 1984), network
(Barabasi, 2014), complexity (Mitchell, 2009; Weaver, 1948), CAS, and dynamical
systems (Lyon & Lyon, 1975) were applicable to this study, and are discussed in greater
detail in Chapter 2. Recent applications of dynamical systems theory include bifurcation
and stability analysis for studying complex adaptive systems (Ruelle, 2014). Anderies et
al. (2013) stated the relevance of dynamical systems theory to the study of adaptation,
decision making, and the alignment of resilience, robustness, and sustainability for
moving global change forward.
Nature of the Study
Specifically, an evolutionary game theory approach to ABMS, using an originally
developed evolutionary PD simulation on the NetLogo platform and statistical modeling
in Excel tested the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between resilience,
robustness, and sustainability as independent variables, and the dependent variable of
adaptive capacity. Stated another way, a simulation study was used to generate the data
for testing the hypothesis that the evolutionary game theory rules governing the traits of
resilience, robustness, and sustainability give rise to the emergent phenomenon of
adaptive capacity for cooperative strategies of climate governance and reciprocal altruism
(i.e., TfT); otherwise, adaptive capacity is compromised, (i.e., there is a decrease in
emergent self-organized behavior of agents) for defective climate governance strategy
scenarios, D. As such, in this quantitative computational experimental study, I employed
a bimodal design using ABMS and statistical modeling for developing a framework for
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organizations viewed as complex evolutionary systems to transcend the current
unsustainable state of organization.
Definitions
Agents: Organizations within the modified basic evolutionary PD simulation used
for this study. The terms agents, players, and organizations are used synonymously in this
study.
Chaos: A regime of behavior in a deterministic, nonlinear dynamical system,
deterministic in the sense that chaotic systems are predictable in pattern (Dooley & Van
de Ven, 1999), exhibiting sensitive dependence to initial conditions, infinite recurrence,
boundedness, one or more Lyapunov exponents (Vaidyanathan, 2015; Wolf, Swift,
Swinney & Vastano, 1985), and lower dimensionality than truly random systems that
have high to infinite dimensionality (Dooley & Van de Ven).
Complicated dynamics: The collective outcomes of the components of CAs
following simple rules (Mitchell, 2009).
Edge of chaos: Regions before and after the chaotic region that display long-lived
localized structures and fall within Wolfram’s Class 4, such as Rule 110 (Mitchell, 2009).
Emergence: Interesting, hard to predict, yet organized behavior (Crutchfield,
1994).
Entropy: The heat that is lost when energy is transformed from one state to
another via work. Entropy is a way of characterizing disorder that assumes all microstates
are equally probable defined by the equation S = k Log W, where S is the macrostate, W is
the corresponding number of microstates for that macrostate, and k is Boltzmann’s
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constant. According to the second law of thermodynamics, entropy increases until it
reaches a maximum value (Boyd & Crutchfield, 2016; Wolfram, 1983).
Fixed-point: State of behavior of cellular automata defined by a highly organized
structure with low entropy (Dooley & Van de Ven, 1999).
Information processing: A type of emergent behavior characterized by the system
gaining information about itself and its environment and the use of such information for
making decisions about what actions to take (Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2012).
Lyapunov exponent: The average exponential rate at which small perturbations
grow in phase space (Wolf et al., 1985).
Macrostate: Collection or set of microstates (Ryan, 2007).
Microstate: Detailed configuration of system components (Ryan, 2007).
Nonlinearity: A necessary but not sufficient condition for emergence (Ryan,
2007).
Ordinary differential equation (ODE): A differential equation that expresses a set
of constraints among the derivatives of an unknown function (Paliathanasis & Leach,
2016). For example,

!
!"

x(t) = ax(t),

(1)
which means that the derivative of the unknown function x(t), is equal to a times
the unknown function itself. The differential

!
!"

x(t) is often annotated as

!#
!"

, or simply as 𝑥

or x’, thus equation (1) becomes 𝑥 = ax.
Self-organization: Resultant patterns of an organization from localized
interactions between the components of a system in the absence of central control,
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including such behaviors as flocking, schooling, clustering, decision-making, foraging,
task allocation, and synchronization (Sayama, 2015).
Sensitive dependence to initial conditions: Small changes to the initial conditions
of a dynamical chaotic system (Goldenfield & Kadanoff, 1999) result in large errors in
predication due to reshuffling of the loops (Kadanoff, 1993).
Shannon information content: The adaptation of Boltzmann’s concept of
statistical mechanics to information measured or computed using the equation H = ,
-./ 𝑝𝑖𝐿𝑜𝑔2

𝑝𝑖 , where H is the message source measured in bits, and M is the possible

number of messages with probability p (Bar-Yam & Yaneer, 1997).
Statistical mechanics: A general mathematical framework that shows how
macroscopic properties emerge or arise from statistics of the mechanics of large numbers
of microscopic components (Bar-Yam & Yaneer, add missing year here).
Statistical mechanics entropy: The number of possible microstates that lead to a
macrostate (Mitchell, 2009).
Symbolic dynamics: The mapping of a set of numbers according to a specific rule
(Wolfram, 1983).
Independent Variables
Organizational resilience (x1): The amplitude of organizational deviation
tolerance possible before returning to an expected output level (Wu et al., 2009).
Organizational robustness (x2): The measure of organizational stability in
fulfilling an expected outcome despite environmental perturbations (i.e., deviation from
an expected outcome), according to Wu et al. (2009).
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Organizational sustainability (x3): The length of time (number of time steps) the
system is able to remain resilient (Wu et al., 2009).
Dependent Variable
Adaptive capacity (xt+1): The quantitative increase in complicated dynamics,
emergent self-organized behavior, and information processing ability (Mitchell, 2009).
Assumptions
Organizations Viewed as Dynamical Systems
This study was developed on the assumption that organizations represent
dynamical systems that display the properties of information processing and
computational optimization therewith associated (Guastello, 2013). A chaotic system is
one type of deterministic nonlinear dynamical system, which organizations may or may
not be (Mitchell, 2009). Organizations as dynamical systems may only be characterized
as chaotic if they satisfy three properties: sensitive dependence on initial conditions,
infinite recurrence, and boundedness (Vaidyanathan, 2015). According to Wolf et al.
(1985), a dynamical system may be classified as chaotic by demonstrating one or more
positive Lyapunov exponents. The assumption that organizations can be treated as
dynamical systems is mathematically relevant for this study to use the logistic map
equation for modeling purposes.
Prisoner’s Dilemma Adequately Represents Climate Governance Decision
Dynamics
As previously discussed, climate change is a tragedy of the commons problem,
which presents the risk of players (nations, states, organizations, and so on) unilaterally
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opting to be free-riders, by not cooperating while benefitting from the efforts of others, as
evidenced by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) negotiations (Bulkeley
& Newell, 2015). One of the challenges associated with such N-Person PGG is the
coordination of collective action into cooperation (Tosun & Schoenefeld, 2017). As
discussed in the literature review, Hurlstone, Wang, Price, Leviston, and Walker (2017)
further clarified the role of collective action in successful climate negotiations using a
game theoretic perspective, underscored by the problems of free-riding and the tragedy of
the commons, and elucidated the applicability of evolutionary game theory, specifically
the PD, for understanding certain conditions of climate negotiation, resulting in either
cooperation (i.e., collaborative governance) or defection, and opined that the only PD
Nash equilibrium is defection. However, I posit an alternative approach for cooperation
considering the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between RRS and adaptive
capacity for cooperative strategies, thereby providing an incentive for cooperation. In
other words, an increase in RRS for individual players in an N-Person PGG using
cooperative strategies implies an increase in self-interested objectives while meeting the
collective public good target.
Self-Organizing Systems Capable of Processing Information
Biological self-organizing systems such as social insects demonstrate the
capability of information processing through their behavior (Detrain, Deneubourg, &
Pasteels, 1999; Shouse, 2002). Other biological self-organizing systems capable of
processing information are brains, as evidenced by research into neural information
processing (Serban, Sordoni, Bengio, Courville, & Pineau, 2016), bacteria, as evidenced
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by quorum sensing (Bassler, 2016), immune systems, plants, and slime molds (Mitchell,
2009). Viewing organizations as systems capable of self-organization, in the sense that
effective processes, structures, and strategies emerge and evolve from teleological
bottom-up processes comparative to biological self-organizing systems, has significant
and far-reaching implications for applied management research, informing the role of
managers (Anderson, 1999) and leaders in the creation of agile organizations.
Scope and Delimitations
Pertaining to scope, Bogdanov’s tektology begins by treating the physical and
psychical, or the world in its entirety, through the lens of organization (as cited in
Biggart, Dudley, & King, 1998). In line with the current perspective on modeling
complex problems using the tools offered by complexity theory, Bogdanov’s tektology
posits treating such problems as composed of complexes and interrelationships (as cited
in Biggart et al., 1998). Applied to the research problem under examination through this
study, the complexes are organizations and the interrelationships aggregate to produce the
characteristics of RRS. This specific focus was chosen due to the sparseness of empirical
research in the field of applied complexity theory to organizational studies, in addition to
the fact that the characteristics of RRS are desirable for organizations experiencing
perturbations from the threats of economic and environmental collapse within the
adaptive cycle. Current literature validates the relevance and need for this study with an
evident lacuna as presented in the literature review section.
This study was bounded by the need for a conceptual management framework,
based on the models of evolutionary game theory and dynamical systems presented in the
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literature review that guides the prediction and control of organizational dynamical
processes, shaped by the interrelationships between RRS, given that resilience is a
functional advantage of the scale-free structural nature of CASs with a power law
distribution (Barabasi, 2014). Thus, network theory constrains structure and function.
This study is further constrained by defining the characteristics of RRS in evolutionary
terms for modeling purposes.
Limitations
The use of an ABMS computational-based experimental quantitative
methodology for studying real-world phenomena relies on abstraction and representation
of specific real-world scenarios using models consisting of agents, agents’ states, rules,
and the environment in which agents are situated. Therefore, an associated limitation of
ABMS is that a model, as an abstract representation of reality, is an idealized or
simplified formalization of the researcher’s perspective of a real-world scenario (Lustick
& Miodownik, 2009). As researchers’ perspectives are subject to their worldview, upon
which the model is then built, the model is twice removed from reality (Lustick &
Miodownik, 2009). Nevertheless, agents are encapsulated within well-defined
boundaries, capable of autonomous, anticipatory, and flexible action within their
environment, and meet their problem-solving objectives (Jennings, 2000). Therefore, the
benefits of ABMS for decision-making and problem solving outweigh the limitations of
abstraction and representation associated with this methodology.
The observing instrumentation of computational experiments in general
introduces spurious information by using finite precision arithmetic, as depicted by
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truncation errors and roundoff errors. The accuracy of the ODE solvers is affected by
parameters such as changes in time. Furthermore, threats to external generalizability
associated with computational modeling are intractable problems and NP-hard problems
(Boschetti & Gray, 2013), which have been mitigated in this study by virtue of setting
finite boundary limitations. Consequently, an applied complexity empirical management
framework for RRSA was developed.
Conceptually, applied complexity theory is viewed in the literature as the third
way of doing science. In other words, in response to the limitations of deductive and
inductive scientific inquiry, applied complexity theory proposes a generative method,
which finds itself in the realm of postnormal science, and which takes uncertainty and
value loading into account while considering multiple perspectives (Funtowicz & Ravetz,
2003). Generative postnormal science studies using ABMS are empirical and therefore
highly generalizable for decision-making and problem solving (Epstein, 1999).
Significance of the Study
This study may provide insight into a lacuna in the current literature on
understanding the relationship between organizational resilience, robustness,
sustainability, and adaptation to climate change, from a complex evolutionary systems or
applied complexity theory perspective using an empirical computational-based
quantitative strategy of inquiry. Greater knowledge of this relationship may be used to
facilitate managerial and leadership decision-making for moving policy forward in a
positive and innovative socioeconomic/sociotechnical manner. Furthermore, this study
has implications for the objectives of the UNFCCC concerning the adaptation of
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developing countries to climate change and the devastating effects of noncompliance if
global policy does not move forward in a positive manner.
Significance to Theory
This is a pioneering study in the field of information systems management in the
sense that the property of agency associated with ABMS enables the study of diverse and
complex sociotechnical systems. Furthermore, organizations and livings beings are
viewed as information processing systems (Mitchell, 2009), thus phenomena as diverse
as ecosystems, biospheres, the stock market, and animal behavior are theorized to fall
within the ambit of information systems management proper. Previous barriers to such a
thorough view of information systems management arises from a combination of factors:
(a) complexity theory, given its interdisciplinary nature, strong connection with
complicated mathematics, and ABMS presents significant challenges for researchers; and
(b) information systems management as a discipline is a nascent field. However, the latter
provides an advantage for the trajectory of future information systems theory to be
shaped by positive socioecological/technical goals and objectives.
The subdisciplines of complexity theory, namely dynamical systems theory,
information theory, and complex adaptive systems science, are navigated in this study to
test the hypotheses as stated in the research questions and hypotheses section. This
empirical computational study illustrates the relationship between RRS and adaptive
capacity in the field of information systems management, drawing on complexity and
game theories in an applied manner, thereby adding value to both the application of
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complexity and game theories and the methodology of ABMS within the respective
domain and discipline.
Significance to Practice
included the notion of agency as central to ABMS, from which perspective living
beings are autonomous information processing systems, and that an evolutionary
advantage can be gained via optimization of these processes (Ay, Der, & Prokopenko,
2012). If the contention that surviving climate change is an evolutionary advantage holds,
then mitigation of climate change may be operationalized through optimization of the
information processes relating to living beings. Past studies in the field of applied
complexity science and information processing have used biological models of ant
foraging and firefly synchronization to inspire optimization and synchronization in
computer science, as evidenced by particle swarm optimization applications (Shi,
Eberhart, & Chen, 1999). According to the literature, applications of ABMS range from
modeling the behavior of agents in the stock market and supply chains and planning
future health care management to anticipating the spread of epidemics and the success of
marketing campaigns (Macal & North, 2014), thereby eluding to the potential efficacy of
applied complexity theory to other technical areas such as the study of climate change
decision dynamics, which this study addresses. Greater empirical knowledge of the
relationship between RRS and adaptive capacity, and more specifically a conceptual
management framework for RRSA, holds the potential to guide governmental decision
making in determining the use and role of incentives and mandates associated with
reducing GHGs, land-use regulation, zoning, urban sprawl, and federal law as it pertains
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to climate change, such as the clean air act, according to Canale (2012). Furthermore,
quantification of the complexity of information systems as sociotechnical systems
facilitates the guidance of diverse dynamical phenomena and the understanding of tipping
points (Vespignani, 2012), which is viewed as critical to future leadership endeavors. The
application or implementation of the derived management framework of RRSA further
addresses the need for innovative policy responses and collective action (Hurlstone et al.,
2017; Tosun & Schoenefeld, 2017) by illustrating networked collaborative climate
governance (Johnston, Hicks, Nan, & Auer, 2011) and is significant to decision making,
problem solving, and thus managerial practice within the field of information systems. By
virtue of the fact that an increase in adaptive capacity is hypothesized to facilitate the
mitigation of threats to the system’s RRS for collective cooperative climate governance
strategies, the resulting RRSA management framework thereby incentivizes
decentralized, polycentric, bottom-up collective action initiatives.
Significance to Social Change
The application of an effective management framework for organizational
resilience, robustness, and sustainability has positive implications for social change in the
sense that the former variables are positively linked to reducing unsustainable business
practices, reducing GHGs and thereby improving global conditions for mitigating climate
change. Climate change during the anthropogenic period has resulted in increased
oceanic acidity, which in turn threatens the oceanic coral reefs (Pendleton, HoeghGuldberg, Langdon, & Comte, 2016). Consequently, the geosphere as an open and
integrated system, including human beings and all organic life forms, could benefit from
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the outcome of this study. The resulting RRS managerial framework provides insight into
complex sociotechnical dynamics, as adaptive dynamics are also a property of complex
socioecological systems (SES) and adaptive capacity is an important aspect of resilience
(Cote & Nightingale, 2012). The provision of incentives using evolutionary traits such as
captured in the RRSA framework for bottom-up collection action, which serves selfinterested parties as well as contributing to the collective goal of mitigating the risk of
global temperatures increasing by 2°C, adds value to the understanding of evolutionary
game theory for future studies involving N-Person PPG dilemmas.
Summary and Transition
Climate governance organizations (state, private, transnational, and community)
viewed as the pinnacle form of anthropogenic activity and as complex adaptive systems
viewed through the lens of complexity theory have a critical role to play in efforts
towards climate change mitigation. In this study, I aimed at understanding the role of
these organizations in mitigating climate change through obtaining insight into the
dynamics of RRSA viewed as evolutionary traits of agile climate governance
organizations. This insight was obtained via a computational experimental research
design or simulation study, using the strategies of an originally developed evolutionary
PD simulation to represent climate governance structures with agents representing
decision-making bodies, including governments, cities, international organizations, and
bodies from the private sector such as private and civil society organizations and
communities (Tosun & Schoenefeld, 2017).
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In summary, this was a pioneer study in the field of information systems
management aimed at providing insight into the decision dynamics of climate change for
effective networked climate governance by understanding the relationship between
organizational resilience, robustness, sustainability, and adaptation to climate change
from a complex evolutionary system or applied complexity and game theoretical
perspective using an empirical computational-based quantitative strategy of inquiry. The
application or implementation of the derived management framework of RRSA is
significant to managerial practice within the field of information systems by facilitating
positive socioeconomic and socioecological change via the mitigation of threats to the
system by increasing adaptive capacity. The literature underpinning this study is
discussed in Chapter 2, and the methodology is covered in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The specific problem was the lack of a management decision framework for
increasing adaptive capacity to climate change via the mechanisms of resilience,
robustness, and sustainability because of improved climate governance structures or
strategies. The purpose of this quantitative computational experimental study was to
develop a management framework of RRSA for climate governance organizations
viewed as complex evolutionary systems in order to transcend the current unsustainable
state.
This chapter includes the literature search strategy used during formulation of the
literature review and research process in general. Related to this, the most frequently
searched terms used in search engines, influential library databases and major journals,
types of literature including seminal and peer reviewed sources, and scope of the
literature review in terms of years searched are discussed. Thereafter, the theoretical
foundation for the study is presented followed by the literature review, summary, and
conclusions.
Literature Search Strategy
The research process employed for this dissertation underwent several
incarnations until becoming finely tuned and second nature. Deriving from the need to
write annotated bibliographies during my PhD course work journey, spurred on by the
finite time constraints of submission deadlines, method became a highly prioritized
requirement of the research process, a fact asserted by Descartes (1960) in his emphasis
of the importance of method in the articulation of the scientific method. However, the
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evolution of my dissertation topic included a discovery phase, during which the current
area of investigation at the time catalyzed the search for references. These preliminary
and foundational topics served as search terms and seeds for related search terms leading
to the discovery and evolution of my current topic, thereby directly informing my
literature search strategy.
A concise list of search terms used for this literature review were complex
adaptive systems, organizational complexity, organizations as complex adaptive systems,
resilience, robustness, sustainability, cellular automaton, agent-based modeling and
simulation, properties of complex adaptive systems, general systems theory, information
theory, fractal dimension, dynamical systems theory, climate governance, networked
climate governance, decision-making for climate governance, Lotka-Volterra models,
application of Lotka-Volterra equations to cellular automata, N & L type collapses,
macro dynamics of climate change, Game of Life, Prisoner’s Dilemma, evolutionary
game theory, , and evolutionary game theory for understanding climate governance.
Journals that were often cited include Simulation, Nature, Ecological Economics,
Scientific American, Evolutionary Economics, Complexity, and Nature Climate Change.
While there are no dissertations that use a computational experimental design for
analyzing organizational RRS in the Walden Library, the literature on complexity and its
study using ABMS for CASs is extensive.
Theoretical Foundation
It is necessary to underscore the contribution of general systems theory (GST) to
the theoretical underpinnings of this study from the perspective that the study and
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consequent understanding of SESs, socioeconomic, sociocultural, and sociotechnological
systems is improved through the lens of complexity and complex systems analysis
(Allen, 2012), which in turn is derived from GST (Midgley, 2003). Complexity theory
provides the theoretical foundation for this study, the early underpinnings of which can
be traced back to the Aristotelian notion of unity being greater than the sum of its parts,
and more recently to GST and cybernetics (Manson et al., 2012). The study of complex
systems is interdisciplinary, meaning that the types of phenomena and systems studied by
complex systems scientists display common properties, which are better understood via
individual core disciplines that are united under the rubric of complexity theory (Manson
et al., 2012). A major proposition of complexity theory is that all complex systems are
composed of simple agents or components that interact with each other in nonlinear
ways, thereby demonstrating emergent behaviors, which cannot be easily understood by
studying the behavior of the individual agents/components (Mitchell, 2009). Complexity
theory embodies the notion that the whole is greater than or different from the sum of its
parts because emergent behaviors such as flocking birds, changes in stock market prices,
or the phenomenon of climate change are collective outcomes of the entire system and
can only be understood at the system level and not at the individual level (Mitchell,
2009). Another proposition of complexity theory is that these nonlinear interactions
resulting in self-organized emergence occur despite the lack of central control, implying
that the system is self-organized via the cooperative behaviors of simple agents or
components (Bar-Yam & Yaneer, 1997; Mitchell, 2009). Types of emergent behaviors
proposed by complexity theory include hierarchical organization, information processing,
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complex dynamics or how system patterns change in space and time, and evolution and
learning resulting in adaptation over time (Wilensky & Rand, 2015).
The general field of dynamics or the study of how systems change and behave
over time is one of the core disciplines of complexity theory, including but not limited to
the flow of fluids or fluid dynamics, the movement of planets or planetary dynamics, and
climate dynamics and other dynamical systems (Bardi, 2011). Dynamical systems theory
is the general field of mathematics that is used to understand dynamical systems via
differential equations, calculus, and iterated maps among others (Boyd & Crutchfield,
2016). Poincaré pioneered modern dynamical systems theory and chaos theory (as cited
in Verhulst, 2016), a central construct of the latter being sensitive dependence on initial
conditions, the relevance of which to this study is discussed at greater length in the
literature review below. Pertaining to the application of dynamical systems theory to the
study of CASs, chaos is the semantically correct technical term used to describe
dynamical systems that display sensitive dependence on initial conditions. The latter
refers to the phenomenon of small perturbations in initial conditions resulting in massive
errors in prediction, colloquially referred to as the butterfly effect, and mathematically
conveyed by the model for population growth known as the logistic map equation: Xt+1 =
rxt(1-xt), where r is the combined effect of birth rate and death rate into a single number,
and x is the fraction of a system’s carrying capacity (Li & Yorke, 1975; Mitchell, 2009),
as shown in Figure A1. Varying the value of r produces different classes of attractors:
fixed point, periodic, and chaotic or strange attractors. The behavior of a dynamical
system sensitive to initial conditions is characterized by the type of attractor obtained by
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varying r, plotted on the x-axis in Figure A1 (Mitchell, add missing year here).
Furthermore, unlike random systems, chaotic systems progress deterministically, and
display universal features such as the period doubling route to chaos and Feigenbaum’s
constant, which is the value of 4.6692016 or the rate at which all unimodal maps
converge to chaos (Rasband, 2015). From this perspective, although prediction might be
difficult, the mathematical language of dynamical systems provides a means of
describing universal properties and behaviors of chaotic systems.
Another core discipline of complexity theory is information theory derived
mathematically from the laws of thermodynamics (Szilard, 1964), central to which is the
concept of entropy used to characterize order and disorder in complex systems (GellMann, 1995; Landauer, 1996). Furthermore, information theory or the study of
representation, symbols, and communication has culminated in the physics of information
(Bennett & Landauer, 1985), a nascent field of research within the discipline of
information. Computation, or the study of how systems process information and then
respond, to which the notion of universal computation is a central construct, is a pivotal
founding discipline of complexity theory (Bar-Yam & Yaneer, 1997). Finally, evolution
or the study of how systems adapt to change over time is an integral discipline of
complexity theory (Bar-Yam & Yaneer, 1997). When united for studying complex
systems, the disciplines of dynamics, information, communication, and evolution share
common goals, such as the development of mathematical and computational tools that
lead to cross-disciplinary insights.
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A challenging aspect of defining complexity theory and an ongoing area of
research is the problem of how to measure complexity. Weaver (1948) proposed that
complex problems be divided into three categories based on (a) difficulty of description
or problems of simplicity such as problems in physics that relate pressure to temperature
consisting of few variables, (b) difficulty of creation or problems of disorganized
complexity that involve trillions of variables, and (c) degree of organization or problems
of organized complexity that involve a moderate number of variables; however, the
variables display nonlinear interactions and cannot be averaged in order to understand the
whole system as is the case with problems of simplicity. Current complex systems
scientists are concerned predominantly with Weaver’s last category of organized
complexity. Lloyd (2001) originally published a list of 40 measures of complexity
grouped according to the difficulty of description as measured in bits (e.g., entropy);
difficulty of creation as measured in time, energy, pounds, and so on (e.g., logical and
thermodynamic depth); and difficulty of organization of the system as measured
according to the context (e.g., algorithmic information content, fractal dimension,
hierarchical complexity, and statistical complexity, with the addition of Shannon
information, and fractal dimension).
From a methodological perspective, complexity theorists rely greatly on computer
based modeling and simulation designs. Axelrod (1997), a seminal thinker and
practitioner in the computational experimental field using ABMS, advocated
parsimonious design for simulation models with the keep it simple stupid principle, a
notion previously expounded by Einstein in that a model should be as simple as possible
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but not simpler. The choice of a computational experimental research methodology was
guided by the fact that complexity theory, as the theoretical foundation for this study, is
complimented at several points of contact, such as the scale of complex systems and
decision making in complex environments, by ABM (Manson et al., 2012).
Referring to the application of complexity theory, the physics of information has
been applied to electronics for charging and recharging a closed-loop battery by means of
an electronic Maxwell’s demon in a box (Schaller, Emary, Kiesslich, & Brandes, 2011)
and biology via the proposition that creation of synthetic biological constructs would be
possible by harnessing biological Maxwell’s demon (Binder & Danchin, 2011). More
specifically, within the scope of information systems management, Valente (2013)
applied complexity and evolutionary theories to organizational processes using an NKlike model for complexity to demonstrate how the refinement of exploitation over
exploration as processes of adaptation are beneficial in the short term but destructive in
the long term, in addition to the ineffectiveness of greedy strategies for organizational
adaptation in the long term.
Similarly, CASs share common properties and constructs, such as observer
dependence, system nestedness, path dependence, adaptivity, chaos, randomness and
instability, diversity and self-similarity, robustness and resilience, evolution, and network
theory, with emergence being the most cited characteristic (Davis & Nikolic, 2014).
Additionally, CASs are modeled using generative bottom-up ABMS (Davis & Nikolic,
2014). Using these tools, it is possible to view organizations as CASs, with systems
embedded or nested within other self-similar systems, in order to study and develop
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greater understanding of system level emergent behavior or epiphenomena such as
climate change (Emmeche, Køppe, & Stjernfelt, 2000).
The domain of artificial life encompasses the theoretical areas discussed above, is
relevant to simulation studies, and more specifically applies to the use of agents in
Netlogo as representations of complex adaptive and dynamical systems (Langton, 1997).
Ergo the rationale for each agent in the evolutionary PD simulation to represent climate
change governing bodies for addressing the research questions of this simulation study,
with the addition of network theory for the guidance of networked governance structure
(Tosun & Schoenefeld, 2017) is theoretically substantiated in a comprehensive manner.
Barabasi (2014) contributed prominently to network theory having discovered scale-free
networks, which follow power law distributions. Scale-free networks range in diversity
from natural biological networks such as viral epidemics, and protein interactions, to the
World Wide Web being the largest man-made scale-free network. For this reason, the
scale-free property is considered a universal network characteristic (Barabasi, 2014).
Applications of the principles of network theory include discovering the factors that
influence the spread of positive network traits and those that limit the weaknesses and
vulnerabilities associated with interconnectivity, such as blackouts and the spread of
information, memes, business practices, power, and energy respectively (Barabasi, 2014).
In current literature, Ostrom (as cited in Tosun & Schoenefeld, 2017)
hypothesized that organizations can self-organize sustainable management systems using
institutional design principles partially derived from CASs theory, (i.e., are composed of
simple components, have clear boundaries, and display collective behaviors). However,
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Ostrom included the principle of monitoring, an exception to CASs theory, which
expounds self-organization despite the absence of external monitoring and central
control.
In addition to complexity theory, evolutionary game theory, which is considered
foundational to decision-sciences, provides theoretical insight for this study. While
historically, game theory can be retrospectively applied to human social behavior from
the time of hunter-gatherers, game theory was introduced academically into the literature
by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), who proposed that a solution exists for all
zero-sum games. Game theory provides the foundational tools for microeconomics, areas
of artificial intelligence, and decision-making within multiple disciplines. Ostrom (1990)
discussed three formative game theory models often employed institutionally for
developing market or state solutions for governing CPRs, namely Hardin’s (1968)
Tragedy of the Commons, Dawes’s (1973; 1974) Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD), and Olson’s
(1965) Logic of Collective Action, using an extensive collection of existing case studies
involving both successful and failed examples of CPR self-governance, by examining
how those institutions affected the performance of their respective political and economic
systems, and how self-governance in those cases evolved via individual choices,
incentives, and strategies. Furthermore, Hurlstone, Wang, Price, Leviston, and Walker
(2017) elucidated the applicability of evolutionary game theory, specifically the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) for understanding certain conditions of climate negotiation
resulting in either cooperation (i.e., collaborative governance, or defection), and noted
that the only PD Nash equilibrium is defection.
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Concerning the governance of climate change, the theory of collective climate
action, referring to actions taken by individuals that are aimed at benefiting the
collective, is derived from environmental and social psychology, and is pertinent to this
study (Tosun & Schoenefeld, 2017). In current literature, collective climate action was
applied to the study of networked climate governance (Tosun & Schoenefeld). Recent
literature further indicated that a networked model of decentralized climate governance,
punctuates traditional hierarchical climate governance structures (Jordan et al., 2015),
thereby forming the new global climate governance architecture (Widerberg & Pattberg,
2015), underpinned by both network theory and the policy change theory of polycentric
governance.
Finally, the theory of polycentric governance is a prominent political science
theory of policy change that informs this simulation study as an approach to climate
policy governance. In contrast to a monocentric political hierarchy, a central tenant of the
polycentric approach is that learning and adaptation are encouraged and improved via
decentralized cooperation and communication across all levels of social organization
(Cole, 2015). Thus, collective climate action, aimed at solving social and combined
socio-ecological problems, was suffused by the theory of polycentric governance (Cole).
Critical analysis of the current literature reveals that the application of
evolutionary game theory and complexity theory, including dynamical systems,
information, and network theories for addressing the research question of this simulation
study is well grounded in existing interdisciplinary studies. Synthesis of the relevant
literature revealed that ABMS is complimented by complexity theory and its subtheories
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for understanding the relationship between RRS and adaptive capacity, which combined
with the polycentric approach to governance, illustrates the decision dynamics of climate
change for application in the field of decision sciences and information systems
management.
Literature Review
Synthesis of the literature relevant to the study of the relationship between
organizational RRS and adaptive capacity within the scope of information systems
management reveals that the constructs of interest for this study are resilience and
adaptive capacity; robustness linked to self-organization and guided self-organization
(GSO); sustainability as applicable to the aforementioned constructs: climate change
governance and decision dynamics of climate change; collapse as it pertains to climate
change, sensitive dependence on initial conditions, nonlinearity, emergence, complicated
dynamics, and information processing. What follows is an exhaustive review of the
current literature describing studies relevant to the constructs of interest, the ABMS
methodology, and ways in which researchers within the field of information systems
management and decision sciences have approached studies closely related to the
research problem, including the limitations and affordances inherent in their approaches.
I will further draw on the literature to substantiate my rationale for choosing the
independent variables of resilience, robustness, and sustainability, and the dependent
variable of adaptive capacity. In addition to the other constructs mentioned above, this
literature review illustrates what is already understood about the variables in current
literature, including controversies, and opportunities for further research.
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Resilience
On the construct of resilience, the literature points to several attempts at defining
resilience within different contexts; however, this stimulation study uses a highly
integrated approach to social, economic, ecological, and technological systems, the
intersection of which are socio-economic systems, socio-ecological systems (SESs) and
socio-technological systems (STSs) respectively. This integrated approach aligns with the
approach of Disturbance as Opportunity (Folke, 2006) for the purpose of defining factors
and their interaction when modeling SESs and organizational resilience to climate
change, and stresses the integration of five types of capital namely social, economic,
human, physical, and natural capital to the resilience of SESs (Mayunga, 2007) requiring
a cross-scalar perspective including social norms, values such as trust, networks, air,
water, and soil (Bahadur, Ibrahim, & Tanner, 2010).
The construct of resilience originally derives from ecological studies in the 1960s
and early 1970s on predator-prey dynamics in relation to ecological stability theory
(Holling, 1961; Holling, 1973). In recent literature, Oliver et al. (2015) defined ecological
resilience in terms of a system’s ability to recover after a disturbance and maintain its
adaptive capacity by resisting regime shifts. However certain ecosystems such as tundra,
boreal forest, mountains, Mediterranean-type ecosystems, mangroves and salt marshes,
coral reefs and the sea-ice biomes are particularly vulnerable to an increase in
temperatures of 2-3%, as indicated by statistics related to degradation and extinction of
species, thereby supporting the argument for ecosystem management as a resilience tool
for mitigation against climate change impacts and complete collapse of the global
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ecosystem (Munang, Thiaw, Alverson, Liu, & Han, 2013). Munang et al. aimed to clarify
the central role of ecosystem management as a resilience tool in climate change
adaptation and disaster risk reduction, discussed ad hoc initiatives driven by ecosystembased adaptation strategies, the need for greater effort and collaboration concerning
ecosystem management, and presented several benefits and advantages pertaining to the
use of ecosystem-based adaptation strategies. Munang et al. concluded that the benefits
and advantages of ecosystem management met the needs associated with UNFCCC
priorities and the Hyogo Framework for Action, albeit requiring appropriate policy and
action.
Socioecological resilience. Cote and Nightingale (2012) extended resilience in
ecology for understanding and analyzing human-environment dynamics and
recommended that insights into resilience be treated as a heuristic for thinking about
environmental-social dynamics. Cote and Nightingale discussed the potential for a
coupled SES approach to facilitate unpredictable change, yet criticized resilience thinking
as an SES approach, flawed due to the lack of allowances for political economic factors,
lacking the tools to address adaptive governance. The goal to address the lack of adaptive
capacity or vulnerability of developing countries to climate change requires adequate
governance informed by an appropriate approach. Effective governance of funds such as
the adaptation fund for moving global change forward requires adaptive governance.
Cote and Nightingale noted that these capabilities are beyond the scope of resilience for
SES, calling for a situated approach or resilience in context approach, which questions
whether resilience to some implies vulnerability to others.
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Social resilience. Within the context of social resilience, the recent literature
expounds a need for human livelihood resilience, as the world’s most economically
vulnerable communities lack adaptability strategies, and are likely to suffer the worst
consequences of climate change (Tanner et al., 2014). Linked to the work of Baggio,
Brown, and Hellebrandt (2013), Tanner et al. noted that livelihood resilience might serve
as a boundary object for improved cross-disciplinary communication, coherence, and
cooperation with anti-poverty climate and development policy serving as the common
object. Baggio et al. conducted a bibliometric analysis to understand whether resilience
serves as a boundary object or bridging concept in the literature, concluding that
resilience has a limited bridging function, mainly for understanding SESs, otherwise
serves as a boundary object for scientific, policy, and social research.
Organizational resilience. Riolli and Savicki (2003) aimed at understanding
organizational resilience within the field of information systems by developing an
integrated theoretical model for individual and organizational resilience using literature
pertaining to the characteristics of the information system work environment on both
levels, however it was unclear whether the factors for resilience at the organizational
level may be used in silico, presenting an opportunity for further research. Riolli and
Savicki extended the theoretical contributions of Thong and Yap (2000) on occupational
stress to organizational resilience, and recommended GST for understanding how
resilience is developed at the organizational level. Riolli and Savicki concluded that the
seven streams of resilience developed by Home and Orr (1998) are advantageous to
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information systems organizations at both the individual and organizational level, and
considered nine key characteristics as integral to their model.
Economic resilience. Pertaining to economic resilience, Röhn, Sánchez,
Hermansen, and Rasmussen (2015) discussed the high cost of economic crises and the
need for an economic framework, as part of an ongoing body of work, that assesses
resilience for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries, and expounded several indicators of vulnerabilities for early detection and
mitigation of costly economic crises in OECD countries. Pertaining to the relationship
between economic and ecological resilience, Fiksel (2006) used several pertinent cases to
succinctly illustrate the paradoxical rebound-effect of greater efficiency in energy use
leading to faster economic growth, resulting in a net increase in the ecological footprint
of society, and pointed out that global economic growth would not be offset by
incremental environmental organizational improvements, with the growth of China and
India contributing to the problem. As such Fiksel highlighted the urgent need for urban
system resilience, and the relevance of the industrial ecology approach toward
sustainability involving a shift from linear models to closed loop models. Fiksel remarked
that industrial ecology research has thus far focused on reducing unsustainability instead
of fortifying the systemic underpinnings of sustainability. Fiksel’s elucidation that the
field of biocomplexity is relevant for understanding sustainable systems was of interest
for further research. Additionally, ecological footprint analysis was used contextually,
revealing the ecological overshoot of mankind’s demand having exceeded nature’s
supply, and therefore relevant to the study of enhancing the resilience of complex
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adaptive systems such as organizations (Fiksel). Of the six integrated approaches
presented for systems modeling and management, thermodynamic life cycle analysis
(LCA) is of relevance to the problem of measuring complexity. Fiksel’s observation that
agent-based modeling underpins the cutting-edge efforts to incorporate sustainable
systems thinking into the design and development of energy and mobility solutions
further substantiates my choice of research design for the specific research question.
Martin, Sunley, Gardiner, and Tyler (2015) extended the construct of economic
resilience for understanding how UK geographic regions have reacted to the last four
cycles of economic recession, underpinned by the North-South Divide, and the
unsustainable and unstable recessionary contraction of 2008, the worst economic
contraction since the Great Depression in the early 1930s. However, the statistical
quantitative methodology employed by Martin et al. is generalizable to other geographic
contexts. Martin et al. concluded that different resilience responses to recessionary cycles
across regions might not only be the result of economic structure, (i.e., that long-term
economic growth is defined as contractions/shocks followed by expansions/recovery
within the business cycle with peaks and troughs as turning points), but also the result of
interactions and linkages of industries between and across regions, and cited several
region specific factors, linked to the economic conditions in each region, that contribute
to the differences in resilience between them. Furthermore, Martin and Sunley (2015)
defined economic resilience, in addition to the usefulness of the construct for
understanding response to shock, by using four recursive steps, namely the risk of a
region’s institutions and employees to shocks, the resistance of those institutions and
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workers to the effect of shocks, their ability to adapt (adaptability) to resume core
functions, and their recoverability. Martin, Sunley, Gardiner, and Tyler (2015) borrowed
the term adaptive robustness from complex biological, organizational, and physical
systems studies to describe an economy’s ability to undergo changes because of shocks
and maintain or restore core functionalities. From this perspective, the construct of
resilience in economic literature (Martin & Sunley, 2015; Martin et al.) was found to be
conceptually consistent with its application in ecological, social, and information systems
management literature, and their intersections.
Characteristics of resilience. Bahadur, Ibrahim, and Tanner (2010) provided a
multidisciplinary perspective, discussed a comprehensive list of approaches and models,
and outlined 16 overlapping conceptualizations of resilience, including key
characteristics and indicators, thereby providing a thorough theoretical background to the
subject of resilience. Bahadur et al. highlighted the need for robust studies aimed at
clarifying both the operationalization of resilience and the relationship between
adaptation, adaptive capacity, and resilience. The 10 main characteristics of resilience
were found to be (a) a high level of diversity in groups performing functions in an
ecosystem; (b) enhanced community cohesion through effective governance and
institutions; (c) acceptance of change and uncertainty; (d) community involvement and
use of local knowledge for resilience-building projects; (e) activities in preparation of
change; (f) systems are characterized by a high degree of social and economic equity; (g)
emphasis on social values and structures; (h) acknowledgement of the nonequilibrium
dynamics of a system; (i) continual and effective learning; and (j) cross-scalar perspective
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of events and occurrences adopted by resilient systems (Bahadur et al.). According to
Bahadur et al., resilience at the organizational scale may share some of the characteristics
of resilience at the systems-level; however, other characteristics may not necessarily
translate well methodologically for assessing organizational resilience (Bahadur et al.).
Bahadur et al. observed that the lexicon for climate change adaptation derived from the
efforts of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Global
Assessment Report, and international policy processes of the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Hyogo Framework for Action are applicable across
multiple disciplines.
Sociotechnical resilience. Bhamra, Dani, and Burnard (2011) included the
intersection of technological systems with social and ecological systems for defining
interconnected organizations and examined their resilience to disasters such as tsunamis,
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, financial crises, and economic recessions with an
emphasis on the importance of making small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) robust
and resilient to disasters. Related to this is the relevance of scale to research on resilience
as it applies to SESs. Engle (2011) discussed the incompatibility of scales used for
policymaking and the ecological boundaries of a system, attributable to the lack of
operationalization and generalization of adaptive capacity concepts, emphasizing the
need for clearly defined system boundaries, and greater understanding of how to measure
resilience and the five types of capital (Bahadur et al., Mayunga, 2007).
Measuring resilience. Cutter, Burton, and Emrich (2010) addressed the need for
metrics and a standard for measuring resilience, with the aim of providing a methodology
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and set of indicators to measure the present conditions influencing disaster resilience
within communities in the Southeastern U.S. Cutter et al. presented divergent views on
community resilience in order to derive the baseline indicators, and used the disaster
resilience of place (DROP) model as the conceptual basis for their study, employing an
empirical strategy of enquiry. Additionally, composite indicators, referring to an
aggregate measure of disaster resilience via the manipulation of individual variables,
were discussed as useful tools for policymaking and public communication (Cutter et al.).
On the other hand, Lee, Vargo, and Seville (2013) aimed to develop a tool to
measure and compare organizational resilience by expanding on the relative overall
resilience (ROR) model developed by McManus (2008). However, Lee et al. used a
quantitative strategy of inquiry and factor analysis to deduce that the original 4-factor
ROR model was not supported, and developed a new 2-factor model of organizational
resilience with planning and adaptive capacity serving as the factors by using the theory
of situational awareness. Furthermore, Lee et al. justified the reliability and validity of
their findings using Cronbach’s alpha. The sample size for the study conducted by Lee et
al. was 1009 organizations, and a survey for organizational resilience based on
McManus’s work using a 4-point Likert scale, was the instrument. Lee et al. concluded
that further research was needed using regression and structural equation modeling to
understand how the indicators identified combine to produce resilience, and the
corresponding weights of their contribution. Ergo, deductively ABMS might be used to
achieve the same ends.
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Resilience management. On resilience management, Folke, Hahn, Olsson, and
Norberg (2005) noted that the costs of collaboration and conflict resolution might be
lowered via the emergence of bridging organizations. Thus, the latter supports selforganization by enabling legislation and governmental policies for co-management of
adaptive capacity efforts. Theoretically, the authors used a SESs approach based on the
move from assessments using the maximum sustainable yield of individual species, to the
management of ecological processes. The work of Folke et al. resonated with that of
Lemos, Agrawal, Eakin, Nelson, Engle, and Johns (2013) in that the authors observed the
counter-productive effects of specific adaptive capacity efforts on the generic adaptive
capacity of a system by using the mobilization of Belizian coastal fisherman as an
example. The operationalization of adaptive governance was therefore proposed through
adaptive co-management of systems, for which four essential features of SESs were
presented (Folke et al.). Ergo adaptive management, in contrast to conventional
management, is the conceptualization that policies be treated as hypotheses and
management actions are the experiments that test those hypotheses (Folke et al.) This
approach to adaptive management is both practical and methodological, serving as a topic
for further examination within the field of organizational resilience, and draws attention
to the intersection between resilience and adaptive capacity.
Similarly, a sustain-centric management paradigm presents several significant
operationalization challenges to organizations. As the literature points out that an open
systems view of resilience is empirically untapped, a lacuna exists for a consistent
conceptualization of organizational resilience for practical and research purposes
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(Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2010). In response to this gap, Linnenluecke and Griffiths
outlined the main aspects of organizational resilience, discussing resilience and adaptive
cycles. A valid contribution to the intersection between resilience and adaptive capacity
was the insight that organizational requirements for coping with major disturbances
exceed those for overcoming minor ones, thereby exceeding the thresholds for adaptation
(Linnenluecke & Griffiths). The authors observed that the coping range of an
organization might be important for statistically or objectively understanding the
extremities of resilience.
Linnenluecke and Griffiths (2010) discussed climate change, extreme weather
conditions and the disastrous consequences therewith associated, provided examples
using real cases, and developed a resilience framework for the study of organizational
adaptation to climate change, because an approach of economic factors of competition to
the former lacks the necessary tools to provide thorough understanding. Because of the
economic factors approach, past methods of coping with sudden changes have included
risk and crisis adaptation mechanisms. These mechanisms aimed at mitigating the
consequences of disruptions such as strikes, changes in demand and competition,
accidents. However, the uncertainty and potential disastrous consequences associated
with climate change and extreme weather conditions is unprecedented. Therefore, the
goal of the resilience framework is to facilitate organizational development of resources
and capabilities that mitigate the disastrous consequence of organizational collapse
because of climate change and weather extremes (Linnenluecke & Griffiths).
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Adaptive Capacity
As previously mentioned, closely linked to the construct of resilience is the
construct of adaptive capacity. Nelson, Adger, and Brown (2007) framed the resilience
approach as being systems oriented, with adaptive capacity serving as a core feature of
social-ecologically resilient systems. Nelson et al. highlighted the role of robustness and
adaptation in the conceptualization of resilience, and the usefulness of resilience as a
framework for analyzing adaptation processes and identification of appropriate policy
responses. Additionally, the inherent characteristics of resilience were deemed to be
consistent, and capable of absorbing disturbances across scales (Nelson et al.). As such
Nelson et al. distinguished between adaptation in the environmental change literature and
adaptation within a resilience framework context, discussing the components of
adaptation in detail. Nelson et al.’s description of adaptive capacity as a core precondition
for a system to be able to adapt to perturbations feeds into my research and is supportive
of the conceptual framework used for my model. The detail provided on the relationship
between the characteristics, processes, and outcomes of an adaptive system is further
useful for the purposes of modeling resilience. The contributions of Nelson et al.’s
resilience framework are of particular relevance to my study, including descriptions of
states, thresholds, surprise, and tradeoffs in resilience and adaptedness.
Engle (2011) addressed the role of adaptive capacity and how it relates to
literature in the fields of resilience, vulnerability, sustainability, and the management
thereof, articulating that there are few efforts concerned with the evaluation of adaptive
capacity across resilience and vulnerability frameworks. As such adaptive capacity was
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defined as a prerequisite for leadership and organizational success in addition to the
recommendations presented by the IPCCC (Engle). Furthermore, Engle distinguished
between different types of adaptation, clarifying the point that the complexity of
adaptation is illustrated through maladaptation. In other words, adaptation is not linearly
positive. Engle clarified the usefulness of adopting coupled SES as the unit of analysis in
resilience research, to understand the way mechanisms fit together, within, and across
systems, which relates to interactions and emergence. Engle clarified the caveat for
translating the construct of resilience into practice by discussing the role of adaptive
capacity in resilience literature and how the former relates to vulnerability.
Adaptive management and governance. Of value to a discussion going forward
on organizational adaptive capacity was the insight provided by Engle (2011) on the
important role of institutions, governance, and management in determining a system’s
ability to adapt to climate change. As such, the former bodies play a vital role in
redistribution of power and contributing to solving the justice issues intrinsic to the
climate change debate, pointing to recent emphasis in the literature on adaptive
management (AM) and adaptive governance (AG) research, which stresses realignment
of decision making to the ecological scale. A key take away from Engle’s work was the
insight that the building of adaptive capacity is rooted in organizational theory, but better
suited for policy application through the coupled SES paradigm, appropriately viewed
through the lenses of resilience and vulnerability.
Reeves and Deimler (2011) framed adaptability as a competitive advantage for
organizations and outlined four organizational capabilities that facilitate adaptation.
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Reeves and Deimler opined that traditional approaches to strategy only apply to stable
environments and that a rapidly changing and unpredictable world requires a different set
of capabilities. According to Reeves and Deimler these second order capabilities foster
rapid adaptation resulting in sustainable competitive advantage.
The role of technology. Reeves and Deimler (2011) discussed the role of
technology in acquiring adaptability, specifically for experimental purposes within the
context of testing services and products. The authors claimed that adaptable companies
use experimentation to a greater degree than their competitors. Additionally, strategy
follows organization in adaptive companies, which were conceived to withstand failure
than those that are not adaptive (Reeves & Deimler). In other words, adaptive companies
were found to be more robust to failure than their competitors because of dispersed and
decentralized decision-making, following a bottom-up rather than top-down approach
(Reeves & Deimler). Reeves and Deimler’s perspective that organizational adaptation to
the environment, specifically to climate change, requires robustness is relevant to this
study and directly informs the choice of robustness as an independent variable for
modeling adaptive capacity.
Lemos, Agrawal, Eakin, Nelson, Engle, and Johns (2013) argued that improved
asset development, institutional access, and an awareness of institutional inequalities
reduce vulnerability through a combination of policies and interventions thereby building
adaptive capacity. Lemos et al. reviewed the literature pertaining to adaptive capacity,
using the IPCCs categorization of the determinants of adaptive capacity as the basis of
their paper, aimed at understanding the factors that make human, social and political
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systems less vulnerable to climate-related phenomena, using a conceptual foundation of
adaptive capacity as generic on the one hand and specific on the other. Lemos et al. cited
two cases, namely disaster risk reduction in Bangladesh and the governance and adaptive
capacity of the Brazilian water sector. The second case aptly illustrated how stakeholder
participation and integration can result in deleterious effects by reducing adaptive
capacity, ergo indicating that specific and generic adaptive capacity efforts are not always
positively related (Lemos et al.). Lemos et al. drew attention to the differentiation
between specific and generic adaptive capacity, specifically their non-linear relationship
highlighted the inherent complexity of adaptive capacity. Nevertheless, an empirical
analysis of this relationship was lacking in the literature, and serves as an area for further
research.
Adaptive capacity and climate change. McEvoy, Fünfgeld, and Bosomworth
(2013) used a conceptual framework derived from studies on adaptation that are framed
by the construct of resilience, and included the effects of climate change and the
difference in temporal and spatial scales of its problems in their discussion. McEvoy et al.
opined that climate change is still in an embryonic stage of development, thus
emphasizing the importance of framing the research, and distinguished between meta,
conceptual, and operational types of frames for this purpose. McEvoy et al. proposed that
the social framing of adaptation is necessary for collaborative processes, highlighting that
differences in opinions might complicate decision-making. Thus, the implications of
resilience as a frame for climate change adaptation were discussed for policy and practice
(McEvoy et al.). Although resilience was an emergent frame for climate change
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adaptation, combining the use of both top-down and bottom-up approaches within an
Australian context, the concepts associated with climate change and resilience can be
thought of as universal, and therefore the conclusion that resilience is important for
policy development in Australia, particularly relating to sustainable communities, is
thought to be generalizable to all SESs within the literature.
Robustness
The construct of resilience as it applies to networks within the field of information
systems management directly informs this simulation study, and is closely related to the
construct of robustness in the literature. Watts’ (2014) conceptualization of organizational
robustness affirms the notion that authors use the terms robustness and resilience
interchangeably, albeit incorrectly. The need to define the term robustness for
constructing a simulation model, calls for close inspection of the parameters, if any, and
theories that apply (Watts). Watts opined that an organization’s robustness, which
involves the ability to allocate resources, innovate, adapt, and solve problems, is related
to its organizational structure. The finding that robustness is a feature of complex
organization, operationalized by the prevention of failure on the one hand, and
preparation for its inevitability on the other (Watts) directly informed my choice of
robustness as an independent variable for this study, and lead to the derivation of my
hypothesis that robustness is required of organizations in order to adapt to climate change
strategic objectives, supported by the pertinent example of the Internet, which is a
networked system requiring robustness in order to survive unpredictable breakdowns
(Watts).
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Guided self-organization (GSO) pertains to the construct of robustness as it
applies to network structure (Ay, Der, & Prokopenko, 2012). Ay et al. defined selforganization as the transition of a system into an organized form in the absence of
centralized control or an external agent, drawing attention to the seemingly paradoxical
nature of the term, guided self-organization (GSO), and addressed this contradiction
using optimal path formation within artificial ant colonies. Ay et al. highlighted the
emergence of organized behavior because of interactions between agents and their
environment, in the absence of an overarching blueprint or design, and clarified the
difference between an explicit effect, (i.e., change in the agent’s decision-making
mechanism), and an implicit effect (i.e., change to the environment).
Perception-action loops of embodied systems relating to GSO may be of value to
my dissertation. Viewing organizational resilience, robustness and sustainability (RRS)
through the lens of GSO provides a novel approach for modeling organizational RRS and
the potential emergent behaviors that may result (Ay, Der, & Prokopenko, 2012).
Furthermore, the optimization principle mentioned by Ay et al. suggested that exploration
emerges because of optimizing information gain, rather than because of behavior
randomization modeling. Thus, the cognitive aspect, or embodied cognition among
multiple agents, of modeling emergence was emphasized and should be examined for
further research. Of relevance was the perspective that living beings are informationprocessing systems, and that an evolutionary advantage can be gained via optimization of
these processes. If the contention that surviving climate change is an evolutionary
advantage holds, then mitigation of climate change may be operationalized through
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optimization of the information processes relating to living beings. The authors discussed
application of this method using the dynamical systems approach to robot control, stating
that the learning rules derived from maximum PI may be used as a tool for selforganization of behavior in complex robotic systems, ergo may be used to guide the
behavior of agents in this simulation study.
Gershenson (2011) discussed random Boolean networks (RBNs) as selforganizing systems, to examine how the changes in nodes and connections affect the
global network dynamics, and discussed eight different methods for guiding the selforganization of RBNs, with emphasis on guiding the RBN toward the critical dynamical
regime. In slight contrast to the principles of GSO, a self-organizing system is described
as one in which the elements interact, thereby dynamically producing a global pattern or
behavior (Gershenson). In other words, a global pattern in produced from local
interactions. Furthermore, Gershenson mentioned that any system, can in principle, be
described as self-organizing, thereby prompting the question of when does it become
useful to describe a system as self-organizing. Gershenson adequately answered this
question by clarifying that self-organization becomes useful when there are at least two
levels of description present (e.g., behaviors and individuals, teams and organization).
Gershenson’s (2011) work is relevant to further research on modeling
organizational resilience, robustness, and sustainability (RRS) from the perspective that
the properties and advantages of the critical regime, which is the phase transition between
the ordered and dynamical phases, apply to life, computation, adaptability, evolvability,
and robustness. Gershenson further recommended the application of the guidance
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methods of RBNs to engineering systems with features of the critical regime, as well as
the study of how living systems evolved via natural selection. For my dissertation, I have
conceived the organization as an embodied system, the properties of which can be easily
interpreted through information dynamics, ergo organizational adaptability to climate
change because of RRS can be viewed as an embodied engineering system.
Emergence and self-organization for robust systems. Related to the work of
Gershenson (2013) about describing science using a non-reductionist language, albeit for
the purposes of GSO, Polani, Prokopenko, and Yaeger (2013) elucidated the difference
between emergence and self-organization using information theory and graph theory, and
an example of particles self-organizing devoid of any emergent pattern-like. Polani et al.
framed GSO as a set of principles that apply to the process of organization across scales
and contexts using the examples of a slime mold approach to the bio-development of
motorways in the Netherlands, and ant-based algorithms with local optimization for
community detection in large-scale networks, which shed light on the use of biological
analogues for modeling networks, thereby substantiating the choice of cellular automata
for this simulation study.
Evolutionary robust systems. Whitacre and Bender (2010) clarified the link
between robustness and fitness of a system by discussing robustness within the context of
evolution. Whitacre and Bender postulated that living systems display two desirable
characteristics, namely, robustness and innovation; borrowing from biological taxonomy,
the definition of phenotypic variability serves as a proxy for evolvability of a system.
Whitacre and Bender noted the limitations of Darwin’s principles of evolution for
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systems of unbounded complexity, with the goal of developing a modern theory for the
evolvability of unbounded complex systems based on the requirement of robustness using
degeneracy, which is the partial redundancy of functions or capabilities of components in
a system.
Whitacre and Bender (2010) applied biological taxonomy to computational
requirements for modeling systems, evidenced by the phenotype attractor, and used a
protein model consisting of genetically specified proteins to illustrate the concept of
degeneracy as applied to modeling. Further discussion of the fitness landscape, neutral
network, 1-neighborhood and evolvability, robustness, and the fitness landscape
exploration, elucidated the degree to which design principles affect system evolvability
(Whitacre & Bender). Whitacre and Bender clarified the link between robustness and
evolvability of a system, ergo applied to this simulation study, an organization that is
robust to climate change, or demonstrates a high degree of adaptability, must also be
evolvable. These concepts have computational implications for modeling which, when
interpreted using information dynamics, are relevant and necessary for modeling RRS.
Sustainability
Thus, the constructs of resilience, adaptive capacity, and robustness have been
discussed within the contexts of social, ecological, technological, and their intersecting
systems, and may be applied to the phenomenon of climate change across all contexts,
underpinned by the fact that industrial, social, and ecological systems are closely
intertwined, calling for a comprehensive systems approach for effective decision-making
regarding global sustainability (Fiksel, 2006). Fiksel explored several questions aimed at
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providing guidance for future research and initiatives towards sustainability using a
qualitative multi-case study approach, and acknowledged the use of dynamic modeling
techniques such as biocomplexity, system dynamics, and thermodynamic analysis by
researchers to study the effects of climate change on ecological and human systems.
Furthermore, resilience was discussed as a necessary quality of complex adaptive
systems, with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPS) incorporating the design
of sustainable systems into their strategy (Fiksel).
While the construct of sustainability is interwoven in the literature on constructs
already reviewed, it is necessary to include the Triple-Bottom-Line (TBL) and triple
value models as innovative frameworks that capture the nuances of sustainable systems,
involving the flows between industrial, societal and environmental systems (Elkington,
1994; Fiksel, Bruins, Gatchett, Gilliland, & ten Brink, 2014; Slaper & Hall, 2011). Slaper
and Hall discussed Elkington’s TBL model, which extended the traditional measurements
of profits (i.e., return on investment and shareholder value, to include environmental and
social imperatives). Thus, the TBL model constitutes people, the planet and profit as
bottom line contributors, thereby also referred to as the 3Ps. Slaper and Hall reviewed the
TBL concept and its application for business, policy-makers and economic development
practitioners, and elucidated that defining the TBL is not where the difficulty lies, but
rather in measuring it. As such, the TBL was developed in response to the struggle
involved with measuring sustainability and the 3Ps, ergo an associated strength of the
TBL is that no universal index or standard measures exist, instead a general framework
may be applied to different entities based on various needs (Slaper & Hall). As
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stakeholders determine TBL measures, depending on the level of entity, type of project
and geographic scope, the TBL framework may be adapted to either narrow or broad
scopes (Slaper & Hall). Slaper and Hall presented several traditional TBL economic,
environmental and social measures, discussed variations of TBL measurement, and
dissected how businesses, nonprofits and government entities might use the TBL with
regards to each of the 3Ps or the economic, social and environmental dimensions,
including the importance of ecological stewardship.
Similarly, the triple value model involves identification of the value pathways in
three types of capital assets, namely industrial economic capital, social and human
capital, and natural capital, which are described and discussed in terms of motivations for
adopting the approach and the results of its application (Fiksel, Bruins, Gatchett,
Gilliland, & ten Brink, 2014). However, the relation of this approach to the triple bottom
line approach, at least from a theoretical perspective was not mentioned. Application of
the RRS model from this simulation study might be facilitated via the use of a triple
bottom line or triple value model.
Relating the construct of sustainability to policy and decision-making within a
Sub-Saharan context, Götz and Schäffler (2015) described ecological challenges facing
the Gauteng city-region, symptomatic of past political decisions to externalize
environmental costs to future generations. Götz and Schäffler drew attention to the weak
implementation of green economy strategies such as the Developmental Green Economy
Strategy (2010) and the Green Strategic Programme (2011) in favor of continued
industrial-policy style decision-making and the consequences thereof, and discussed the
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Gauteng Green Strategic Programme (GGSP) within the Gauteng City-Region (GCR),
outlining the major ecological issues of the GCR, such as acid mine drainage (AMD),
variable rainfall patterns, high GHG emissions, poor air quality and high resource
consumption in addition to socio-economic challenges such as urban sprawl resulting
from apartheid geographies, and the dependence of industries on cheap coal-fired
electricity. Götz and Schäffler elucidated that the GGSP was developed in response to a
massive economic downturn involving the loss of 250 000 jobs (6% of employment)
between 2008 and 2010. The lack of implementation of GGSP objectives and goals,
clearly demonstrates the importance of political decision-making, governance,
institutional support and organizational capacity to operationalize strategy. Despite a
well-defined mandate and existing programs for supporting green economic efforts, no
progress has been made. Götz and Schäffler attributed this lack of progress to a common
policy implementation problem, embedded in cross-departmental cooperation challenges
and a set of governmental conundrums, which they discussed in detail.
The work of Anderies, Folke, Walker, and Ostrom (2013) is of relevance to
affecting sustainable global change. Anderies et al. noted that sustainability has become
an accepted concern for organizational executives who do not possess the necessary tools
or knowledge for its successful initiation. Additionally, the distinction between resilience,
robustness, and sustainability was discussed in terms of their alignment for global change
(Anderies et al.), thus substantiating the use of sustainability as an independent variable
for this simulation study. Several pertinent examples were provided in support of the
plausibility of sustainable actions at the individual level, be it firm, organizational or
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other entity, derailing sustainability at the global level, or at the system level (Anderies et
al.). Therefore, a key element for this study, derived from the work of Anderies et al., is
the necessary distinction between the individual level of sustainable action and the global
or systemic level thereof.
Sustainable technology. Amemiya-Ramírez (2014) clarified the use and
definition of sustainable technology; having no negative effect on the environment,
society, the economy, or other technological systems, and carried out an assessment of
sustainable technologies using hard and soft system analyses, both quantitative and
qualitative in nature respectively. Amemiya-Ramírez used a system dynamics modeling
methodology and information on shale gas extraction as an alternate solution to the
energy crisis of the 1970s to assess whether shale gas is a sustainable energy source, and
consequently provided a definition of sustainable societies, economies, environments,
and technologies, explaining that aspects of the definition of sustainability are
quantitative or measurable while other aspects are qualitative. Amemiya-Ramírez
concluded that the production and use of shale gas contributes significantly to greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions, with high water consumption involved in the extraction process,
ergo shale gas was found to be an unsustainable energy source using system dynamics
and simple modeling techniques.
Sustainability management. The construct of sustainability as it applies to
management is often framed in the literature within the context of social responsibility.
For example, the ISO26000 standard formalizes the need for guidance on social
responsibility and states, “An organization’s performance in relation to the society in
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which it operates and to its impact on the environment has become a critical part of
measuring its overall performance and its ability to continue operating effectively” (ASQ
& Manpower Professional, 2010). Furthermore, ISO26000 was articulated as a mindset,
to be applied at all levels of organization, i.e. planning, execution, and stakeholder
interaction for right action, including the seven principles of social responsibility and
their application to core subjects (ASQ & Manpower Professional).
ASQ and Manpower Professional (2010) noted that society’s consumption
outstrips the world’s biocapacity to regenerate by approximately 30%, thereby requiring
organizational attention, and further revealed in a study conducted in 2008 that social
responsibility constituted the second leading force of change in quality. ASQ &
Manpower Professional conceptualized organizational success as the dual objective of
achieving sustainability through social impact and bottom-line growth. Furthermore, an
integral characteristic of social responsibility was the willingness to include
environmental and social considerations into decision-making, and the accountability
thereof (ASQ & Manpower Professional).
Catastrophes, disasters, and system collapses. The constructs of resilience,
adaptive capacity, robustness, sustainability, and climate change are often discussed in
the literature within the context of predicting and/or preventing catastrophes, disasters,
and system collapses. Mrotzek and Ossimitz (2008) acknowledged the contribution of
climate change to catastrophes and employed a systems dynamics theoretical framework
to model and understand common systemic structures and behaviors of catastrophes,
using the Integrated Modeling Environment program at the International Institute for
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Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), which served as the theoretical paradigm for the
view that catastrophes comprise extreme events. Furthermore, Mrotzek and Ossimitz
described several cross-disciplinary catastrophe theories including the integrated systemic
theory of catastrophes (ISTC) based on Senge’s general system archetypes. Their
discussion on ISTC included applicability of catastrophe archetypes, identifying and
modeling of catastrophe archetypes and finally presentation of a set of catastrophe
archetypes. Mrotzek and Ossimitz concluded that the ISTC enables identification of
systemic patterns in the field of catastrophe research, informing basic patterns of
modeling catastrophes. Of the six catastrophe types presented by Mrotzek and Ossimitz,
overload catastrophe, overshot catastrophe and tragedy of the commons, and creeping
catastrophe might be of theoretical value to the study of organizational RRS and
consideration is given to the recommendation that catastrophe archetypes be used for
inclusion of catastrophe aspects into existing models.
Organizational collapse. Linnenluecke and Griffiths (2010) aimed at facilitating
organizational development of resources and capabilities that mitigate the disastrous
consequence of organizational collapse because of climate change and weather extremes
using a resilience framework, because an economic factors of competition approach to
the former lacks the necessary tools to provide thorough understanding. Because of the
economic factors approach, past methods of coping with sudden changes have included
risk and crisis adaptation mechanisms. These mechanisms aimed at mitigating the
consequences of disruptions such as strikes, changes in demand and competition, and
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accidents. However, the uncertainty and potential disastrous consequences associated
with climate change and extreme weather conditions is unprecedented.
Limits to growth. Turner (2012) posed the question of whether the scenarios of
the original collapse as articulated in Limits to Growth (LtG) simulation models and text
of Meadows D. H., Meadows D. L., Randers, and Behren (1972) were present in the
events leading to the global financial crisis (GFC). In other words, if the former
hypothesis is true, then the GFC could be a predictor of the collapse presented in the LtG
standard Run scenario. Turner (2012) thus tested his hypotheses and conducted the study
using observed data over a 40-year period from 1970 to 2010, for comparative purposes,
to the World3 model for three key scenarios simulated in the LtG model. Turner
concluded that the observed data was in line with the standard Run scenario simulated by
the LtG, resulting in global collapse beginning in 2015. Furthermore, Turner’s
presentation and discussion of the standard Run, comprehensive technology, and
stabilized world scenarios from the LtG simulations shed light on the relevance of the
LtG for simulation modeling work.
The observed data presented by Turner (2012) was enlightening when viewed in
comparison to the graphed LtG scenarios. For population and crude birth rates, the
observed data matched the LtG comprehensive technology scenario closely. However, the
observed data for crude death rates followed a trajectory closer to the stabilized world
scenario. In contrast, the observed data for industrial output per capita, food per capita
and services per capita were closer to the standard Run scenarios, which resulted in
collapse in the LtG simulations. Finally, the author’s conclusions including the fact that
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focus by the scientific community on climate change detracts from imminent global
economic collapse, attributable to declining resources, particularly oil, is a point for
further consideration.
Eastin, Grundmann, and Prakash (2011) discussed the current global warming
debate in relation to the LtG discourse, relating the work of Turner (2012) on Gaia to the
scenarios presented in the Limits to Growth (LtG) model by comparing the observed
data. However, in contrast to the opinion held by Turner, Eastin et al. opined that the two
cases differ fundamentally, albeit share a technocratic approach to public policy.
Nevertheless, Eastin et al. agreed that the standard Run simulation of the LtG model is an
accurate depiction of the future, and clarified a key theoretical point by contrasting the
problematic greater growth paradigm with the view that developing countries are the
main challenge. Eastin et al. stated that this difference fundamentally narrows down to a
difference in perspective, (i.e., the LtG school of thought views the overarching growth
paradigm as the challenge), whereas the neo-Malthusians consider the developing
countries crisis to be the focus (Eastin et al.). Furthermore, sustainable development
replaced the LtG paradigm in the 1980s, positing the optimistic possibility of economic
growth as compatible with environmental protection and resource conservation, whereas
the LtG paradigm considered growth as inimical to environmental protection (Eastin et
al.).
Climate Change
Climate change serves as a mitigating construct for this simulation study.
Specifically relating to the field of information systems management and decision-
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making, Miles, Snover, Binder, Sarachik, and Mantua (2006) articulated the need for a
national climate service (NCS), in response to the lack of climate information being used
for planning, despite the advances made in the field of climate science, ergo an NCS was
conceptualized to bridge the gap between climate science and decision-making thereby
improving adaptive capacity through planning for climate changes. Miles et al. proposed
five research questions relating to the development of an NCS conceptual framework,
each of which were discussed within the context of observation, modeling, and research
as the three legs of the NCS institutional structure, and discussed challenges facing the
creation of an NCA such as institutional barriers and organizational infrastructures.
Shull (2011) focused on the use of software to support climate studies, opining
that the field would benefit from the collaboration of experts from multiple disciplines.
Shull specifically aimed at understanding the experiences of climate modeling software
developers in light of the complex political controversies surrounding climate change,
thus interviewed Jacob, a computational climate scientist in the mathematics and
computer science division of Argonne National Laboratory; and Schmidt, a climatologist
and modeler at the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, discussing various aspects
of the climate modeling process, with specific emphasis on validating model results
covering topics such as testing the code, comparing model outputs to analytically derived
answers, divide-and-conquer strategies, and benchmarking. Shull provided the insight
that models are not validated via comparison to real-world data, but rather to thought
experiment conditions for which scientists have the answers. However, this point does
not apply to validation of the LtG scenarios discussed further on in this literature review,
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which were tested according to actual real-world data. Therefore, despite the impressive
qualifications of the interviewees, the conclusions of this article were not supported in the
literature regarding the validation of the LtG model, which is a milestone in the modeling
literature.
The UNFCCC (2014) employed a pragmatic approach to provide guiding
principles and criteria for practical establishment of the climate technology network
(CTN), and outlined the requirements for CTN membership, which included the
requirement for members to follow specific institutional structures that are clearly
outlined within the document, and responsibility of all members. The UNFCCC assumed
that establishment of a CTN would enhance or contribute to their overall goals and
objectives, with developing country Party National Designated Entities (NDEs)
represented via members of the CTN. The CTCN initiative falls within the technological
portal of the UNFCCC as a technological mechanism, with the guiding principles and
criteria for the establishment of the climate technology network report, approved by the
Advisory Board of the Climate Technology Center and Network on 9-11 September 2013
in Bonn, Germany, and serves an important role in the establishment of a network for
mitigating climate change, albeit fair representation of developing countries is of
concern.
Canale (2012) framed a solution to climate change as consisting of a combination
of incentives and mandates governed by cooperative federalism, aimed at reducing the
amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Canale described the climate change
problem, land-use regulation, zoning, urban sprawl, and federal law as it pertains to
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climate change, such as the clean air act (CAA). However, Canale did not test his
hypothesis that land-use planning holds the potential to slow global climate change.
Similarly, reduction of GHGs through Smart Growth was discussed conceptually,
however not examined quantitatively or explored qualitatively (Canale). Nevertheless,
Canale’s recommendation that federal government should mix incentives with mandates,
as was exemplified by the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority (GRTA), is
relevant and significant to reducing GHGs, and spoke to the need for policy to drive
global change forward and is relevant at the organizational level.
On the other hand, based on the premise that good local development plans
promote sustainable urban land use, provide environmental protection and reduce risks by
managing threats from natural hazards, Grover (2010) aimed to assess whether local
planning policies influenced local greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), and if so what was
the effect? Grover addressed this research question using a quantitative strategy of
inquiry, and a pretest-posttest nonequivalent groups quasi-experimental research design,
and estimated emissions in a geographic information systems (GIS) software
environment. Grover’s conceptual framework involved viewing the urban environment as
consisting of three areas, the human environment, the biophysical environment, and the
local policy environment.
Grover (2010) raised the pertinent point that certain mitigation strategies might
lower the adaptive capacity of individuals using the A1T, A1B, A1F1, A2, B1, and B2
scenarios contained in the fourth intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC)
assessment report. This point shed light on the challenges of integrating mitigation and
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adaptive activities, which arise primarily from the differences in scale (international
versus local and regional) and time (immediate versus long term) of each activity.
Grover’s research methodology, design and use of statistics further substantiated the
perspective that agent-based modeling and simulation offers an unparalleled
thoroughness for studying complex systems, such as climate change within the
organizational context.
The opinion held by Munang, Thiaw, Alverson, Liu, and Han (2013) that climate
change has the potential to trigger a positive shift to a sustainable global civilization is
optimistic considering the relevant scientific literature and simulations of global scenarios
such as those proposed in the LtG model. Nevertheless, the black swan outcome scenario
proposed by the authors, although improbable is still possible, as evidenced by other
black swan (highly improbable but possible) game changing events that have occurred
throughout history. The perspective held by Munang et al. is one to consider for modeling
the potential outcomes of climate change and more importantly, consideration of weights
for outcome scenarios, such as a sustainable global civilization as an extreme outlier
scenario.
Climate Governance
This simulation study is aimed at understanding the dynamics of climate change
decision-making, to which the construct of climate governance is central and determines
the agent types within the simulation model. Ostrom’s (1990) work is considered
foundational to the construct of climate governance in the literature, as it pertains to the
governance of common pool resources (CPRs), and understanding how to avoid their
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exploitation and manage associated administrative costs. Ostrom overviewed three
formative game theory models often employed institutionally for developing market or
state solutions for governing CPRs, namely Hardin’s (1968) Tragedy of the Commons,
Dawes’s (1973; 1974) Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD), and Olson’s (1965) Logic of Collective
Action, using an extensive collection of existing case studies involving both successful
and failed examples of CPR self-governance, by examining how those institutions
affected the performance of their respective political and economic systems, and how
self-governance in those cases evolved via individual choices, incentives, and strategies.
Eastin, Grundmann, and Prakash (2011) noted the technocratic paradox inherent
in climate change policy. In other words, the UNFCCC has put forth recommendations
for policy in developing countries pertaining to climate change and adaptive capacity;
however, climate change poses challenges and problems, which only the technically
skilled elite are suited to tackle. Thus, the technocratic approach to public policy required
for climate change is in and of itself symptomatic of the justice issues embedded in the
climate change debate.
Moore (2012) discussed climate change policy in terms of adaptation
negotiations, clarifying adaptation as a separate policy area, as developed by the
UNFCCC to include the needs of the poorest communities, resulting in the
institutionalization of policy. As such Moore framed the problem of climate change in
terms of being driven by activities in first world countries albeit affecting those most
vulnerable in third and developing world countries, as well as other animal species, and
future generations the most. Moore’s work thus drew attention to the relationship
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between adaptation and vulnerability; clarifying the adaptation debt of
developed/industrialized countries owed to developing and vulnerable nations, (i.e. that
funds sourced from rich countries should be channeled to poor countries) for
development purposes guided by the norm of obligatory compensation known as
adaptation restitution, which does not concern the nature of projects funded, viewing the
financial transfer itself as facilitating adaptation. However, the construct of adaptation
debt also includes the norm of adaptation development, which does concern how the
funds are used within a country, taking climate change adaptation into consideration
(Moore). From this perspective, Moore opined that adaptation debt, framed by the
competing norms of adaptation restitution and adaptation development, is robust albeit
the conflicting source of consensus and controversy in UNFCCC adaptation negotiations,
yet underscores the US $100 billions of climate financing pledged in Copenhagen
(COP15) expiring in 2020.
Barnes et al. (2013) clarified that the need for policy responses to climate change
substantiates the already well-developed scientific understanding the anthropological
contributions or human systems that generate climate change. Ergo Barnes et al. proposed
questions via which anthropological studies might contribute methodologically and
analytically to the study of climate change; its mitigation and adaptation. In support of
the research presented by Moore (2012) and Barnes et al. (2013) on the disproportion of
power between developing and developed countries, Berkhout (2012) added that
organizational adaptation processes should consider the needs of climate change
vulnerability. The perspective provided by Berkhout included households, private and
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public sector organizations and civil society as examples of organizations. From this
perspective, the Adaptation Fund for climate change represents an organization, which
takes the needs of previously marginalized countries into consideration, thereby
representing an innovation to previous organizational structures (Moore).
Networked climate governance. Tosun and Schoenefeld (2017) discussed the
phenomenon of networked decentralized climate governance, using Bäckstrand’s (2008)
conceptualization involving three types of transnational climate partnerships, namely
governmental, private-to-private, and the hybrid public-to-private, including bodies such
as civil society organizations, communities, national governments, cities, international
organizations, and corporations. Tosun and Schoenefeld argued that the disparate
portrayal of the notion of collective climate action with networked climate governance in
the literature can be reconciled by framing networked climate governance as an
opportunity structure for collective climate action, underpinned by the need for a new
climate governance system because of the impasse in international climate negotiations,
and challenges with the pace of policy change. According to Tosun and Schoenefeld, farreaching social change involving transformations to individual production and
consumption patterns, and more substantial involvement from citizens at the subnational
level constitutes collective climate action, which can be diffused to larger international
areas, exemplified by the Transition Towns movement case. Ergo Tosun and Schoenefeld
discussed the motivations needed for collective action with the aim of understanding the
underlying factors that contribute to individual willingness to participate or contribute to
localized climate initiatives such as renewable energy cooperatives in order to facilitate
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and govern citizen involvement such as modification of consumption behavior, signing
petitions, boycotts, demonstrations, and other forms of political activism, and highlighted
the social dilemma of free-riding, occurring at both the individual and state levels, as a
barrier to successful collective action initiatives. Tosun and Schoenefeld’s articulation of
three governance functions, namely information sharing, capacity building, and rulesetting are relevant for modeling governance functions. Their work drew attention to the
research question of how grassroots organizations might positively affect networked
governance, and vice versa, as areas for future research.
Cole (2015) discussed the advantages of a bottom-up polycentric approach to
climate change policy in contrast to a monocentric hierarchical approach characterized by
top-down decision-making framed by the lack of progress thus far made by the
UNFCCC; a problem, which Ostrom (1990) partly attributed to the lack of time needed
for mutual trust to develop between individuals for mutually beneficial transactions such
as climate change negotiations. Cole highlighted the role of private actors in polycentric
governance initiatives, citing the formation of the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) in 1992 as an example. The WBCSDs collaboration
with CEOs of private organizations and scientists from the Stockholm Resilience Centre
for the creation of the ACTION2020 programme, the aim of which is to develop business
solutions that contribute to mitigating a 2° C rise in global temperatures by 2050, is an
example of successful polycentric climate change governance (Cole).
Bulkeley and Newell (2015) discussed climate change governance, and opined
that the multiple scales of political decision making; fragmented and blurred roles of
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state and non-state actors; and the GHG producing processes engrained in everyday
production and consumption patterns all contribute to the complexity of climate change
governance. Bulkeley and Newell questioned the role of nation-states in solving the
climate change problem, which she considered to be not solely a global issue, proposing
that a framework for understanding how climate change is governed must include an
understanding of the multitude of actors involved in its governance. Bulkeley and Newell
proposed that treating climate change as an international or global problem evokes the
tragedy of the commons problem in which no actor or institution has control of the
atmosphere as a common resource. Bulkeley and Newell discussed the importance of
understanding the role of regimes in the governance of climate change, and pointed out
that the survival of the Kyoto Protocol, despite the non-cooperation and free-riding
hegemonies, substantiates that the institutional whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
Climate governance and game theory. Hurlstone, Wang, Price, Leviston, and
Walker (2017) further clarified the role of collective action in successful climate
negotiations using a game theoretic perspective, underscored by the problems of freeriding and the tragedy of the commons, as previously discussed. Hurlstone et al. reiterated
Milinski, Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Reed, and Marotzke’s (2008) finding that high-risk
perception has a positive effect on facilitating cooperation or collaboration for simulated
catastrophe avoidance. Milinski et al. came to this conclusion by using a simulation game
to test the Nash equilibria of various scenarios for free riders, fair-sharers, and maximum
contributors for the purpose of mitigating the disastrous consequences of climate change,
ergo Hurlstone et al. elucidated the applicability of evolutionary game theory, specifically

72
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) for understanding certain conditions of climate negotiation
resulting in either cooperation (i.e., collaborative governance, or defection, and opined
that the only PD Nash equilibrium is defection). According to Johnston, Hicks, Nan, and
Auer (2011) successful collaborative governance, as a type of democratic governance, is
fostered by shared commitment, mutual accountability, and a willingness to share risk,
thereby calling for the inclusion of all stakeholders affected by the problem. Johnston et
al. framed the contingency model of collaborative governance created by Ansell and Gash
(2008) as highly influential in the literature. Ansell and Gash found the process of
collaboration to be of a complex nature, exhibiting characteristics of complexity theory
such as path dependence and sensitive dependence on initial conditions. However,
Johnston et al. used ABMS, specifically Netlogo, and a chain-building game theoretic
approach to test the strategic choices, dilemmas, and situations involved in collaboration.
Johnston et al. acknowledged the relevance of the PD game theoretic for understanding
the dynamics of collaborative governance, ergo their work substantiates my choice of
research design and instrument. Additionally, Nowak and Sigmund (1993) presented
Pavlov, the win-stay lose-shift strategy with probabilities (p1, p2, p3, p4) = (1, 0, 0, 1),
which they found outperformed both tit-for-tat (TfT) with probabilities (p1, p2, p3, p4) = (1,
0, 1, 0) and generous TfT (GTfT) strategies, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, using an
evolutionary simulation, in which they observed each Run for 107 generations, with a
total of 105 mutant strategies generated. TfT is the strategy, which involves a player
cooperating if their opponent cooperated in the previous round, and defecting if their
opponent defected in the previous round. TfT was found to be the optimal strategy for
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reciprocal altruism (Axelrod, 1984). The GTfT strategy involves a player cooperating
after an opponent’s play of cooperation in the previous round, but also cooperating, with
a probability pi, after the opponent’s play of defection in a previous round, which Axelrod
referred to as TfT with forgiveness.
Adami, Schossau, and Hintze (2016) articulated the paradox of cooperation,
which derives from the Nash equilibrium strategy of PD being defection, as also stated by
Hurlstone, Wang, Price, Leviston, and Walker (2017). Adami et al. presented the
replicator equation, an ODE used in this simulation study to determine the fraction of
cooperators from the entire population consisting of cooperators (C) and defectors (D), as
well as the density of Ds. Additionally, the work of Adami et al. elucidated the validity of
N-person PD simulations involving infinite populations, and the limitations of finite
populations, including the fact that the outcome for the replicator equation was
approached accurately with finite populations.
Methodology
On methodology, the lack of historical information regarding the scenarios
leading up to organizational resilience to climate change pointed to a lacuna in the
literature for the development of managerial methodological approaches for resilience.
Linnenluecke and Griffiths (2012) addressed this gap, with the authors recommending
methodological pathways to organizational managers for resilience assessments.
However, this work is also pertinent to researchers in the field of modeling organizational
resilience to climate change as approaches for identifying factors that facilitate
organizational resilience were presented. Linnenluecke and Griffiths addressed the
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research question of whether and how recognizing and isolating the contributing factors
can predict future organizational resilience to climate change and extreme weather
conditions. Furthermore Linnenluecke and Griffiths clarified that retrospective analyses
of past cases have been the prominent empirical approach for assessing organizational
resilience, albeit have not uncovered the full range of factors leading to resilience,
thereby substantiating the additional approaches presented for this purpose, namely
climate projections, analogues, high impact studies, identification of factors promoting
organizational resilience, business loss estimation models, resilience indicators,
scenarios, and identification of thresholds.
Linnenluecke and Griffiths (2012) defined the coping range for organizations as a
range of circumstances defined by one or more climate-related variables, that an
organization is capable of withstanding without experiencing adverse consequences.
Reminiscent of the edge-of chaos in guided self-organization (GSO) literature, are the
edges of the coping-range, towards which conditions become increasing more
challenging, but still tolerable. Beyond these boundaries, adverse reactions to climate
change become significant. From this perspective, adaptation is viewed as the ability of
an organization to widen its coping-range, albeit requiring time for implementation
(Linnenluecke & Griffiths). The authors further clarified that some researchers view
resilient organizations as possessing sufficiently wide coping-ranges to deal with
variability in climatic conditions, while others postulated that resilience is needed by
vulnerable organizations to rebound once the coping-range boundaries have been
exceeded. From this perspective, a resilient response was defined by the rapidity and/or
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amount of recovery to a pre-disturbance or even an improved state, with impact
resistance and rapidity as key organizational performance indicators ranging from 0%100% (Linnenluecke & Griffiths).
The work of Linnenluecke and Griffths (2012) provided insight into methods of
assessing organizational resilience to climate change and weather conditions, and the
complexities therein involved. The authors aptly raised the question of how information
concerning future climate and weather extremes can be derived on an organizationally
relevant scale, in addition to the relevant question of what leads to organizational
resilience and which variables should be measured in a study to determine future
organizational resilience. As key performance indicators of resilience, impact resistance
was shown to be facilitated by the variables of decentralization, diversity and redundancy
of organizational resources and structure, while rapidity by variables of the processes that
identify problems, establish priorities, and mobilize and deploy resources.
Agent–based modeling and simulation (ABMS). Hughes, Clegg, Robinson, and
Crowder (2012) substantiated the fact that there is a gap and need in organizational
literature for simulation modeling, the problems of which are well suited to the method,
by stating that they could find only a single simulation model in the Journal of
Occupational and Organizational Psychology. As such, Hughes et al. examined agentbased modeling and simulation (ABMS); its uses; functionality; advantages and
opportunities; and clarified the thoroughness involved in the use simulation modeling in
answering questions in contrast to other traditional methods. For example, researchers
must explicitly explore all assumptions and aspects of a process to develop a model.
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Some of the questions researchers must ask to develop an effective simulation model are:
what are the variables, agents and characteristics of the model? What is the sequence of
events? Are there feedback loops, and what triggers them? (Hughes et al.) The model
then tests these assumptions, which can be modified until an adequate solution is found.
Researchers must understand a scenario completely to make assumptions about the tasks,
goals, rules, states, processes and plans of a system. Ergo in contrast to traditional
models, ABMS provides a sophisticated level of granularity. Another key difference
between ABMS and other approaches such as hierarchical task analysis (HTA) is that
simulation modeling generates rather than deduces solutions to problems, based on realworld scenarios. Thus, the resulting system is generated in an elegant emergent manner
that takes the interactions between agents and their environment into consideration
(Hughes et al.). An important difference between statistical methods such as regression
and structural equation modeling and ABMS is that these methods are discrete, capable
of measuring only snapshots, whereas ABMS captures continuous dynamism (Hughes et
al.). Hughes et al. clearly articulated reasons for the use of ABMS to study complex
scenarios, as a complementary approach to statistical modeling, since ABMS do not test
the strength of relationships between variables, nor do they examine cause and effect
relationships. A bi-model design using ABMS and statistical modeling was the optimal
approach to understand the relationship between organizational resilience, robustness,
sustainability (RRS) and climate change adaptation.
Macal and North (2014) clarified the importance of agent-based modeling and
simulation (ABMS) for organizational decision-making, and cited the models that have
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been developed in this regard. Macal and North stated the relevance of ABMS to
complex adaptive systems, and their discussion of sustainable, self-organizing patterns
and emergent organization as properties of ABMS was of relevance to the study of
organizational RRS and its relationship to climate change adaptation. Fioretti (2013)
described a lacuna in social science research, requiring simulation-modeling techniques,
particularly organization science, and clarified that organizational problems involving
micro-interactions and macro-behaviors are well suited to ABM.
ABMS platforms. Gilbert (2008) briefly discussed the differences between
Swarm, Repast, Mason, and Netlogo as platforms for ABMS, providing a useful table of
comparative features; however, focused on Netlogo, which is the platform used in this
simulation study for understanding the relationship between organizational RRS and
adaptive capacity. As such Gilbert provided code for simple practical model development
in a tutorial-style, including several screenshots from Netlogo to illustrate the use of
Netlogo for model building, and clarified that the first step in building a model involves
making fundamental decisions regarding the agents and the environment. Furthermore as
systems modeled using ABM can be of any scale comprising discrete entities, in addition
to defining system boundaries, a crucial step in modeling complex systems involves
capturing the characteristics of entities and their interactions (Manson, Sun, & Bonsal,
2012). As such, self-organization as a characteristic of complex systems, and emergence
as a characteristic of CASs results from the interaction between entities at lower levels
giving rise to larger entities and emergent behaviors (Manson et al.).
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Helbing and Balietti (2011) discussed ABMS at great length and included a
discussion on the usefulness of simulation studies for socio-economic sciences in
addition to the advantages of ABMS, including the affordance of understanding selforganization and emergence. Helbing and Balietti provided several examples of ABS and
discussed the principles of the methodology. The work of Helbing and Balietti supports
the choice of ABMS as a methodology for this simulation study.
Addressing complexity with ABMS. Pertaining to ABMS as a methodology and
the constructs associated with the theory of complexity, Manson, Sun, and Bonsal (2012),
opined that the constructs of sensitive dependence on initial conditions, nonlinearity, selforganization, emergence, complicated dynamics, and information processing, deriving
from complexity and evolutionary game theories are mutually complemented by a
computational experimental research design using ABMS. In fact, Manson et al. opined
that complexity theory and complex systems provide the theoretical foundation for ABM
in general. Manson et al. elucidated the relevance of complexity constructs to a
computational experimental methodology using ABM within the scope of social science
studies and policy fields. Manson et al. identified three types of complexity research:
algorithmic complexity for understanding and replicating systems using heuristic,
mathematical and/or computational terms; deterministic complexity envisioned through
the lens of nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory, using sets of mathematical terms for
determining the trajectory of complex systems; and aggregate complexity for
understanding how complex systems emerge through interactions, each contributing to

79
the overall understanding of a system of almost any scale, and its connection to the
external environment.
ABMS for studying organizational adaptation, robustness, and
sustainability. Wu, Hu, Zhang, Spence, Hall, and Carley (2009) used ABMS to explore
organizational adaptation on the Netlogo platform. Wu et al. used agility, robustness,
resilience, and survivability as their independent variables, and organizational adaptation
as their dependent variable. From this perspective, the study by Wu et al. was relevant for
this simulation study for illustrating how to define the independent variables of
resilience, robustness, and sustainability; and adaptive capacity as the dependent
variable. Mitchell’s (2009) discussion of complex systems substantiates the applicability
and usefulness of ABMS for understanding how behaviors at lower levels give rise to
behaviors at higher levels in complex systems as diverse as the human immune system,
the brain, ant colonies, and organizations.
Humanity is facing serious challenges in the form of financial crises, international
wars, and global terror, the spreading of diseases; cyber-crime; and demographic,
technological, and environmental change requiring innovative approaches to complex
systems and emerging phenomena (Helbing, Bishop, Conte, Lukowicz, & McCarthy,
2012). Moving away from a component-oriented view of the world to an interactionoriented view of the world is an example of the directive perspective required, or a
paradigm shift that calls attention to the interaction between components rather than the
components themselves (Helbing et al.), which is useful for testing the resilience,
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robustness, and sustainability, or dynamics of climate change governance for the purpose
of improving adaptive capacity.
Summary and Conclusions
The constructs of RRSA have been framed in current literature within the context
of information systems management and their efficacy for understanding and mitigating
climate change via the dynamics of climate governance. More specifically using a
multidisciplinary, cross-scalar, integrated approach to various forms of resilience,
including economic resilience, ecological resilience; social resilience, organizational
resilience, resilience management, models of resilience, resilience measures, and their
intersections, serving as an independent variable; interwoven with the construct of
adaptive capacity, serving as the dependent variable; and the constructs of robustness,
and sustainability, serving as independent variables. Furthermore, the constructs of
disaster management and collapse were discussed in relation to climate change studies
(Canales, 2012; Grover, 2010; Shull, 2011; UNFCCC, 2014) and climate governance
(Bäckstrand, 2008; Berkhout, 2012; Bulkeley & Newell, 2015; Hardin, 1968; Olson,
1065; Ostrom, 1990; Tosun & Schoenefeld, 2017; UNFCCC, 2014) using an ABMS
methodology (Hurlstone, Wang, Leviston & Walker, 2017; Linnenluecke & Griffiths,
2012; Macal & North, 2014). While the constructs are independently well grounded in
the literature and intertwined, no single study exists for understanding the dynamics of
climate governance through the lens of complexity using resilience, robustness,
sustainability, and adaptive capacity to test the efficacy of collaborative or cooperative
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governance structures using the PD game theoretic, thereby indicating a lacuna for this
simulation study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this quantitative computational experimental study was to develop
a management decision framework of RRSA for climate governance organizations (state,
private, transnational, and community) viewed as complex evolutionary systems to
transcend the current unsustainable state. I tested the hypothesis that a positive
relationship exists between organizational resilience defined as the amplitude of
organizational deviation tolerance possible before returning to an expected output level.
Robustness was defined as the measure of organizational stability in fulfilling an
expected outcome despite environmental perturbations; sustainability was defined as the
length of time (number of time steps) the system is able to remain resilient; and adaptive
capacity was defined as the quantitative increase in complicated dynamics, emergent selforganized behavior, and information processing ability for cooperative decisions and
negative for defective decisions associated with climate governance strategies of types
evolutionary-RRSA, evolutionary-tit-for-tat, repeated-cooperate, and repeated-defect.
The objective was to relate the evolutionary traits of resilience, robustness, and
sustainability (independent variables) to the adaptive capacity (dependent variable) of
organizations using an originally developed evolutionary PD simulation in Netlogo and
statistical modeling in Excel. The evolutionary game theory rules of PD have been
adapted for this study to understand the complex dynamics of RRSA embedded in
climate change decision-making structures that either limit or facilitate adaptive capacity.
The independent variables of resilience, robustness, and sustainability were defined in
evolutionary game theory terms for this study. The dependent variable of adaptive
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capacity was defined as the quantitative increase in adaptive behaviors of agents in
NetLogo (i.e., a quantitative increase in complicated dynamics, emergent self-organized
behavior, and information processing ability).
This chapter includes a discussion on why mixed methods, qualitative methods,
and nonexperimental, and quasi-experimental research designs were not chosen for this
study. Consequently, the appropriateness of the computational experimental research
design, specifically ABMS and statistical modeling to the specific research question, is
discussed, outlining how the chosen research design informs and advances knowledge
within the scope of information systems management. Time and resource constraints
consistent with the research design are also presented.
Research Design and Rationale
As there is a need to test hypotheses for examining the relationship between
variables, a qualitative strategy of inquiry was not appropriate, of which neither the
associated worldviews or strategies of data collection and analysis are of relevance to this
study. Similarly, a mixed methods approach was not necessary as there was no need for
in-depth inductive understanding in tandem with deductive reasoning for this study.
Moreover, as surveys were not an aspect of the research design, as and the population
consists of organizations that were not selected using systematic bias, neither
nonexperimental nor quasi-experimental types of quantitative designs were applicable to
this study. A bimodal computational-based experimental quantitative research design, or
simulation study in combination with statistical modeling, was chosen to test the
hypotheses due to it being a well-recognized method for studying complex systems
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(Mitchell, 2009). Agent-based modeling underpins cutting-edge efforts to incorporate
sustainable systems thinking into the design and development of systems within the scope
of information systems management (Fiksel, 2006). Hughes et al. (2012) substantiated
the fact that there is a gap and need in organizational literature for simulation modeling,
the problems of which are well suited to the method. Similarly, Fioretti (2013), and
Macal and North (2014) substantiated the choice of ABMS for studying complex
adaptive systems such as organizations, specifically regarding sustainable, selforganizing patterns and emergent organization, such as the dynamics of cooperation, as
properties of ABMS.
The objective was to address the research question, which was to understand the
relationship (linear, superlinear, sublinear, power law, or other) between organizational
resilience (x1), robustness (x2), and sustainability (x3) and adaptive capacity (Y) for
cooperative and defective climate governance strategies. As such, I tested the hypothesis
that a positive relationship exists between the evolutionary traits of resilience, robustness,
sustainability (independent variables) and adaptive capacity (dependent variable) of
organizations (state, private, transnational, and community) that operate within
cooperative or collaborative governance structures (Johnston et al., 2011). In other words,
the objective was to test that the agents in the simulation display evolutionary traits of
resilience, robustness, and sustainability with increased adaptive capacity for cooperative
decisions. The alternate hypothesis, that the relationship between the independent and
dependent variables was negative for defective decisions, was also tested.
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While Wu et al. (2009) used ABMS to explore organizational adaptation on the
Netlogo platform with agility, robustness, resilience, and survivability as their
independent variables, and organizational adaptation as their dependent variable, their
work was not related to climate change and did not address the efficacy of climate
governance structures using PD strategies. The constructs of RRSA were framed
separately and partially connected in the literature to facilitate organizational
development of resources and capabilities that mitigate the disastrous consequence of
organizational collapse as a result of climate change; ergo this simulation study
consolidates the gaps between the constructs for achieving this purpose.
Methodology
Testing the relationship between RRS and adaptive capacity is well suited to a
computational-based experimental quantitative method of inquiry. Simulation modeling
generates data, which are then used for deducing solutions to problems based on realworld scenarios in contrast to other approaches such as hierarchical task analysis,
according to Hughes et al. (2012). Thus, the resulting system is generated in an elegant
emergent manner that takes the interactions between agents and their environment into
consideration.
As this was a simulation study, data were generated and not collected. More
specifically, an ABM using PD evolutionary game theory was used to simulate the
decision dynamics of climate governance structures, using the constructs of RRS to test
the efficacy of the governance structures based on the hypothesis that a positive
relationship exists between RRS and adaptive-capacity to climate change, quantified as
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an increase in complicated dynamics, emergent self-organized behavior, and information
processing ability of agents, for cooperative or collaborative strategies (Johnston et al.,
2011) for governing the commons by adhering to a specific emission target. Therefore, I
tested the relationship between RRS and A for the evolutionary-RRSA PD strategy, in
which agents were bred as either cooperators or defectors and played their respective
inherited strategies, either cooperate or defect, against each other; the evolutionary-TfT
strategy, which included actions of both cooperation and defection; as well as repeatedcooperate as a strategy consisting of only cooperative decisions; and repeated-defect as a
strategy consisting only of defective decisions. In the evolutionary-TfT PD game, the
inherited phenotype was overridden, and players instead chose the strategy taken by their
opponent in the previous round. In other words, if the opponent cooperated in the
previous round, then the player cooperates in the current round, and similarly if their
opponent defected in the previous round, then the player defects in the current round,
irrespective of their breed, and a GA is used to optimize their decision scores at the end
of each round. For the repeated-cooperate PD strategy type, both cooperators and
defectors chose to cooperate in both previous and current rounds despite what the
opponent had decided. Similarly, for the repeated-defect PD strategy type, both
cooperators and defectors chose to defect in both previous and current rounds despite
what the opponent had decided. Lastly, the evolutionary-RRSA PD game is the only
game in which players used their hard-wired phenotype to play against each other. The
relationship between RRS and adaptive-capacity for the actions of cooperation and
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defection was assessed by analyzing the generated data of oscillatory decision dynamics
from agents in the simulation.
The simulation was set up as follows: Each agent was given an emissions
allowance at the beginning of the simulation, and the game ran with emissions rewards
for cooperation and emissions penalties for defection. The emissions rewards and
penalties can be set using a slider on a scale from 0 to 100. At the end of each round, the
emissions score retained by the agent was indicative of whether the agent had used their
emissions allowance. The agents that exceeded the emissions target were removed at
each time step if the eliminate-organizations switch was on. If either the sum of all
agents’ emissions scores was greater than the emissions target, less than zero or
sustainably less than the emissions target, the simulation stopped due to organizational
collapse, or reached a stable sustainable state with emissions below the target or below
zero and the message “organizational collapse—emissions target exceeded or sustainable
resilient state achieved” was printed in the observer window respectively.
Each strategy was described using conditional probabilities of the opponent’s
move in the previous round denoted by
𝑃 = (p(C|CC), p(C|CD), p(C|DC), p(C|DD)) ≡ (p1, p2, p3, p4) for cooperation,
where the character to the left of the vertical line denotes the probability of the
agent to cooperate, the vertical line denotes the given condition, with the first character
after the vertical line denoting the action taken by the agent in the previous round, and the
second character to the right of the vertical line denoting the action taken by the opponent
in the previous round. For example, p(C|CC) is the probability that the agent will
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cooperate given that the agent cooperated in the previous round and their opponent also
cooperated in the previous round, which is equivalent to p1 and so on. And
p(D|DC) =1 −p(C|DC) for defection.
The probabilities within the context of ABMS represent genes, which are evolved
using a GA (Adami et al., 2016). According to Adami et al. (2016), the TfT PD game in
which players consider the opponents’ previous action requires 2k genes, or probabilities,
where k is the number of players. The relative fitness of generations is then considered
and a random fraction Q = 1/N of the population is removed. Q is an important quantity
for the population dynamics of the simulation as the ratio 1/Q also determines the average
number of games played by each agent (Adami et al., 2016).
An important distinction exists between the payoffs to players (T, R, P, S), which
are considered to be some gain or loss (fiscal, production, or other) from their carbon
emitting activities and their emissions scores. Payoffs and emissions scores are
considered to be inversely proportional in the absence of emissions penalties and
cooperation rewards. According to Epstein (1998), a typical payoff matrix for NPD
assumes the form of
C
𝐶 (𝑅, 𝑅)
𝐷 (𝑇, 𝑆)

D
(𝑆, 𝑇)
(𝑃, 𝑃)

where if both players cooperate, they receive the payoff (R, R); if one cooperates and the
other defects, the payoff is S to the cooperator and T to the defector; and if both defect,
each player receives a payoff of T, such that T > R > P > S (Axelrod, 1984). In other
words, the highest payoff T goes to the player who defects against a cooperator. The
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second highest payoff R results from mutual cooperation, cooperating against a
cooperator. The second lowest payoff P results from mutual defection, defecting against a
defector, and the smallest payoff S goes to the player that cooperates against a defector.
Population
The population for this simulation study consisted of heterogeneous climate
governance organizations, specifically of the types state, private, transnational, and
community, as specified by the research conducted by Bulkeley and Newell (2015),
Ostrom (1990), and Tosun and Schoenefeld (2017). As this was an N-Person PGG PD
simulation study, an infinite, well-mixed heterogeneous population was assumed, with a
fraction xC(t) of N constituting Cs, and the remaining population 1- xC(t) of N
constituting Ds, denoted determined by the sampling strategy discussed below and
constituted the governance population in its entirety, leading to richer dynamics (Pacheco
et al., 2009). The size of the population of initial cooperators at each Run can be set by
the user, by means of a slider, as a percentage of the total population.
Sampling and Sampling Procedures
Random sampling of organizations within a well-mixed heterogeneous infinite
population N for NPD produces evolutionary dynamics and leads to groups that follow a
binomial distribution and the formation of the average fitness of Cs (fC) and Ds (fD)
(Pacheco et al., 2009). According to Adami et al. (2016), the infinite population would be
sampled within the simulation, with the fraction of the population consisting of Cs
determined by the ODE:

90
𝑥C(t) = xC(t) ∗ (1 −xC(t)) [−(b +a)xC(t)+a] assuming two strategies a and b are
played and a fraction of the population is removed at each time step; consequently, the
fraction of the population consisting of Ds was sampled using the ODE:
xD(t) = 1 −xC(t)
Within the context of the model N = n-organizations, which is a slider and xC(t),
the number of cooperators, is denoted by the code create-cooperators round ((initcooperation / 100) * n-organizations), while xD(t), the number of defectors is denoted by
the code create-defectors round (n-organizations - ((init-cooperation / 100) * norganizations))
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
The PD model for adaptive capacity is based on the original PD game theory
formulated by Dawes (1973; 1974) and was discussed at length by Ostrom (1990) in
relation to climate governance. The PD has further been used in recent studies for
understanding climate governance structures, incentive, mandates, and other strategies for
decision making to mitigate the disastrous consequences of climate change as evidenced
by the work of Cole (2015), Doncaster, Tavoni, and Dyke (2017), Hurlstone et al. (2017),
and Milinski et al. (2008), thus substantiating the use of the PD for this simulation study.
The PD model has been used extensively in existing literature related to
evolutionary game theory for the testing and exploration of cooperative and defective
strategies. Originally, Axelrod (1984) found that the TfT strategy outperformed all others
in games of reciprocal altruism using the PD model. Nowak and Sigmund (1993) built
upon the findings of Axelrod, and presented the Pavlov strategy, which they found
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outperformed TfT using the PD model. Furthermore, O'Gorman, Henrich, and Van Vugt
(2009) used an iterated PD model to posit strategies that constrain free-riding, which
involves Ds benefiting from the efforts of Cs while simultaneously defecting (Bulkeley &
Newell, 2015). In other words, if there were m number of contributors, then the defectors
get the contribution mIc/N, whereas the contributors only get mIc/N – c. Ergo in
heterogeneous groups, the defectors always win. Thus, the NPD has significance as a
means of understanding the decision dynamics associated with climate change
negotiations as climate change is viewed as a tragedy of the commons problem in the
literature, which is approached using various types of PGG game theories, the most
predominant being NPD (Bulkeley & Newell, 2015; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990).
Intervention Studies or Those Involving Manipulation of an Independent Variable
This study does not involve intervention studies, or the manipulation of an
independent study. The independent variables are operationalized as follows:
Organizational resilience (x1) is the amplitude of organizational deviation
tolerance possible before returning to an expected output level (Wu, Hu, Zhang, Spence,
Hall, & Carley, 2009);
Organizational robustness (x2) is the measure of organizational stability in
meeting the emissions target despite environmental perturbations, (i.e., the lower the
deviation from the expected outcome the higher the robustness) according to Wu et al.
Organizational sustainability (x3) is the length of time (number of time steps) the
system remains resilient or x3 = t(x2) according to Wu et al.
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Data Analysis Plan
The generated data from simulation was analyzed within the Netlogo environment
by plotting each dependent variable against the independent variable on separate graphs
to inspect the evolutionary dynamics between RRS and adaptive capacity. In other words,
there are three graphs: (a) y = organizational adaptive capacity defined as the quantitative
increase in complicated dynamics, emergent self-organized behavior, and information
processing ability, and x1 = organizational resilience defined as the amplitude of
organizational deviation tolerance possible before returning to an expected output level
(Wu, Hu, Zhang, Spence, Hall, & Carley, 2009); (b) y = organizational adaptive capacity
as defined in (a) and x2 = organizational robustness defined as the measure of
organizational stability in fulfilling an expected outcome despite environmental
perturbations, (i.e., deviation from an expected outcome) according to Wu et al. (2009);
and (c) y = organizational adaptive capacity as defined in (a) and (b), and x3 =
organizational sustainability defined as the length of time (number of time steps) the
system is able to remain resilient. The graph for (c) is hypothesized to be defined by the
relationship y = x3(1-x3) (fC – fD), where fC is the average fitness for cooperators, and fD is
the average fitness for defectors. This relationship is defined as the time evolution for the
fraction of cooperators in current literature (Pacheco, Santos, Souza, & Skyrms, 2009).
The average fitness of agents after each Run determines the next generation of
chromosomes (i.e., probabilities) in the genetic algorithm (GA) for the evolutionary
demographic game. At the end of each Run, an aggregation of the data is performed and
the conclusion of that Run is printed in the observer window, which is a feature within
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the Netlogo simulation platform that enables direct programming of agents and patches,
as well as observation of printed output.
As data was generated from simulation experiments, there were no human
subjects implying that there were no confidentiality restrictions or permissions associated
with data use and dissemination. IRB approval (number 05-22-17-04320) was attained
based on the specifications articulated in the IRB application for this simulation study.
The data generated from simulations in Netlogo was exported to Excel for statistical
analysis. The data was cleaned by removing all non-essential information such as syntax
and missing data was treated as missing. A Langrange multiplier technique was used to
treat data before analyses to avoid violating the assumptions of normality,
homoscedasticity, and serial independence (Jarque & Bera, 1980). Regression analyses
was then performed in Excel at a confidence interval of 95% to test the relationship
between variables. Validity and significance of relationships was determined using pvalues < 0.01 for all independent variables and F-statistics > 5 for each analysis.
Threats to Validity
External Validity
The definitions, quantifications, and boundary conditions for the independent
variables for this study were derived from current literature. Organizational resilience
(x1) is the amplitude of organizational deviation tolerance possible before returning to an
expected output level (Wu et al., 2009); organizational robustness (x2) is the measure of
organizational stability in meeting the emissions target despite environmental
perturbations; and organizational sustainability (x3) is the length of time (number of time
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steps) the system is able to remain resilient or x3 = t(x2). The definition and quantification
of the dependent variable adaptive capacity y as the quantitative increase in complicated
dynamics, emergent self-organized behavior, and information processing ability is well
grounded in the literature (Mitchell, 2009). Thus, measurement of the variables
accurately reflects the theoretical underpinnings of complex adaptive systems and
evolutionary game theory.
Regarding conclusion and external validity, as this was an N-Person PD, the
population of agents can be set to replicate the actual population of organizations
involved in climate governance, using the n-organizations and init-cooperation sliders
for sampling of Cs and Ds at each Run, thereby providing accurate statistical power.
Moreover, at any given Run the well-mixed heterogeneous random sampling of the entire
population to represent groups eliminates systematic bias and ensures high external
validity. This study was not time bounded and the findings from ABMS are highly
generalizable. Generative post-normal science studies using ABMS are empirical and
therefore highly generalizable for decision-making and problem solving (Epstein, 1999).
Internal Validity
Regarding the internal validity of ABMS studies using game theory, finite
populations render the replicator equation approach for outcomes inaccurate (Adami,
Schossau, & Hintze, 2016). However, due to the stochastic nature of this study, and Nperson population using ODE sampling, the threats of selection bias and attrition are
eliminated. Moreover, in line with decisions made in the real world, individuals are
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unlikely to behave completely deterministically, thus the probabilities assigned to agents
within the simulation stochastically capture real world decision dynamics (Adami et al.).
The design decisions for ABMS studies are crucial and will ultimately affect the
population dynamics. For example, setting the probabilities as discrete or continuous
variables will have significantly different outcomes. However, due to the quantification
and boundary limitations of variables, the threat of ambiguous temporal precedence is
mitigated. Additionally, as there is not intervention or treatment involved in testing the
relationship between RRS and A for cooperative strategies the historical internal threat
and threat of regression artifacts are mitigated, and the removal of individuals by the
random fraction Q = 1/N eliminates the threat of maturation. Finally, the evolutionary PD
is a stable and well-tested instrument thereby eliminating unwanted changes in
measurement.
Construct Validity
Construct validity concerns the recognition and measurement of the relationship
between variables using the measuring instrument. As discussed extensively in the
literature review, the variables of resilience, robustness, sustainability, and adaptive
capacity have been studied quantitatively using ABMS at various levels of organization
(Davis & Nikolic, 2014; Epstein, 1999; Manson, Sun, & Bonsal, 2012). The
measurement of the relationship between variables was conducted using generated data
from the simulation (Epstein, 1999), and analyzed using regressions analysis, which is an
established method for testing hypotheses concerning the relationship between variables.
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Summary
This was a computational experimental quantitative research design, specifically a
simulation study using agent-based modeling and the evolutionary PD model derived
from game theory (Adami, Schossau, & Hintze, 2016; Axelrod, 1984; von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1944) for testing the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between
the independent variables of organizational resilience (x1), organizational robustness
(x2), organizational sustainability (x3); and the dependent variable of adaptive capacity y.
The independent variables are defined as follows, organizational resilience (x1) is the
amplitude of organizational deviation tolerance possible before returning to the expected
emissions target (Wu et al., 2009); organizational robustness (x2) is the measure of
organizational stability in meeting the emissions target despite environmental
perturbations; and organizational sustainability (x3) is the length of time (number of time
steps) the system is able to remain resilient or x3 = t(x2). The dependent variable of
adaptive capacity y is defined as the quantitative increase in complicated dynamics,
emergent self-organized behavior, and information processing ability (Mitchell, 2009).
The relationship between the dependent variable and each of the independent variables is
hypothesized to be positive for decisions of cooperation, else negative for defection in all
evolutionary-RRSA, evolutionary-TfT, repeated-cooperate, and repeated-defect PD
games. Regression analysis was used to test the relationship using generated data from
the simulation study. Internal, external, and construct validity for this study are high
given that systematic bias was eliminated, and that post-normal generative ABMS are
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highly generalizable (Epstein, 1999). Data collection and results of the simulation study
are discussed in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: Results
In review, the purpose of this simulation study was to develop a management
framework of RRSA for organizational regimes involved in climate governance viewed
as complex systems to transcend the current unsustainable state. An evolutionary game
theory approach to ABMS, specifically using the PD model addressed the research
question of what the relationship (linear, superlinear, sublinear, power law, or other)
between organizational resilience (x1), robustness (x2), and sustainability (x3) and
adaptive capacity (Xt+1) for cooperative and defective climate governance stratagems
was, and I tested the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between organizational
RRS as independent variables and the dependent variable of adaptive capacity for
cooperative stratagems. Greater knowledge of this relationship may be used to facilitate
decision making to move global climate change policy forward in a positive
socioeconomic manner.
This chapter includes the timeframe for model creation and data collection and
any discrepancies between the actual data collection methods and those described in
Chapter 3. The results of the study are presented in the following section, including
statistics and assumptions. In the conclusion, the contents of this chapter are summarized.
Data Collection
In Chapter 3, I discussed my intended use of the basic evolutionary PD model;
however, in practice, the as-is parameters of the existing basic evolutionary PD model did
not sufficiently capture the decision dynamics needed for this study. As such, a new
model, namely the evolutionary-RRSA PD, using PD PGG theory was developed, which
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captures the dynamics of decision making and is representative of the variables of
interest. It is important to mention that the new model does not compromise validity as
discussed in Chapter 3, as the game theory rules associated with the PD PGG remain as
the basis of the simulation. As data were generated from simulations for collection, and
this chapter addresses discrepancies in data collection between methods discussed in
Chapter 3 and actual data collection, actual model setup must be described in contrast to
that which was theoretically proposed in Chapter 3. There are several discrepancies from
Chapter 3 in terms of setting up the model, discussed below and summarized in Table
A1.
In Chapter 3, before model development had begun, the plan was to use an
infinite well-mixed heterogeneous population, with the fraction of the population
consisting of Cs determined by the ODE (Adami et al., 2016):
𝑥C(t) = xC(t) ∗ (1 −xC(t)) [−(b +a)xC(t)+a] assuming two strategies a and b are
played and a fraction of the population is removed at each time step; consequently, the
fraction of the population consisting of Ds would be sampled using the ODE:
xD(t) = 1 −xC(t)
In practice, a finite well-mixed heterogeneous population (Epstein, 1998, 2006)
was required to test the relationship between variables, with xC(t), or the number of
cooperators denoted by the code
create-cooperators round ((init-cooperation / 100) * n-organizations)
and xD(t), or the number of defectors denoted by the code
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create-defectors round (n-organizations - ((init-cooperation / 100) * norganizations))
In other words, the population consisted of two types of players or breeds, either
cooperator or defector, who inherited a fixed strategy or phenotype on model setup as a
result of their breed. Cooperators and defectors were indistinguishable to each other but
were coded as blue and red respectively and were paired at random to execute a specific
strategy type, as described in Table A2. The sample of cooperators and defectors was
representative of the population of interest, namely climate governance organizations, in
that this study addresses the decision dynamics of the population, which consist solely of
the decision types cooperate and defect. Sample size can be adjusted in the model to be as
large or as small as required, with a minimum of two agents. There were no upper bounds
to the size of the sample population other than computing speed and time, as the more
agents that are added, the longer the processing time of each time step. As the sampled
population is finite, the ODE replicator equation approach for sampling discussed in
Chapter 3 was no longer valid; however, the threats of attrition and selection bias were
mitigated via random sampling.
As shown in Table A2, cooperators and defectors were only hard-wired to
perform their respective fixed strategies for the evolutionary-RRSA PD game. For the
evolutionary-TfT PD, both cooperators and defectors executed the strategy their partner
played in the previous round; in other words, if their partner defected in the last round,
they also defected in the current round. Likewise, if their partner cooperated in the
previous round, they cooperated in the current round, regardless of their breed, and genes
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were optimized at each round via a GA, thus representing a repeated game with Memory
1. The repeated-cooperate PD and repeated-defect PD simulations forced both
cooperators and defectors to play the cooperate strategy and defect strategy respectively
repeatedly until the simulation ended. An eliminate-organizations chooser provided the
option of eliminating organizations with the lowest fitness, determined by whether their
emissions-score had exceeded the emissions-target or not at each time step, in contrast to
the random quantity Q = 1/N described in Chapter 3. The risk of maturation was
nevertheless mitigated due to new agent sets with zero memory populating the phase
space at each new Run of the simulation.
The timeframe for data collection was calculated from the start of model creation,
as Runs were performed and data were reviewed during model development to assess
whether the variables of interest were captured and PD game theory rules applied. The
timeframe from the start of coding to the end of data generation for collection and
analyses spanned 4 months. The resulting univariate analyses from the graphs y = f(x1), y
= f(x2), and y = f(x3), where y is the dependent variable adaptive capacity, x1 is resilience,
x2 is robustness, and x3 is sustainability showed that the hypothesized relationships
between the dependent variable and each of the covariates for defective and cooperative
decision types were valid and justified the inclusion of these covariates in the model.
Study results are discussed in detail in the next section.
Study Results
This chapter addresses the statistical measures of the mean, median, mode, range,
minimum, maximum, and standard deviation, their associated assumptions, confidence
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intervals, effect sizes as appropriate, and write-up of statistical results arranged according
to the research question and hypotheses. Specifically, I include the output tables and
graphs for the statistics of the metric variables x1 = resilience, x2 = robustness, x3 =
sustainability, and y = adaptive capacity, per simulation per Run respectively in the
appendix. The data output files were generated in Netlogo using BehaviorSpace to Run
each experiment and were exported to Microsoft Excel where the descriptive statistics
tables were formatted. Statistical analyses were conducted in Excel to analyze the data
generated in Netlogo for testing the relationship between variables. All graphs were
generated in Netlogo. The PD payoff matrices are reported in tons of emissions;
therefore, smaller values are preferred for calculating the NE.
Statistical Assumptions
1. The input data were not weighted for all metric variable descriptive statistics
tests.
2. Missing values were treated as missing for all metric variable descriptive
statistics tests.
3. All nonmissing data were used for all metric variable descriptive statistics
tests.
4. No assumptions were made regarding the distribution of the scores for the
untreated data.
5. The cases represented a random sample of the population, and the scores are
independent of each other.
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6. The assumptions of normality, homoscedasticity, and serial independence
were not violated by application of the Lagrange multiplier technique (Jarque
& Bera, 1980).
7. The four payoffs, defect-against-cooperator (T), cooperate-against-cooperator
(R), defect-against-defector (P), and cooperate-against-defector (S), were
ordered according to the PD definition (i.e., T > R > P > S).
Statistical Results
Evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation experiment. Table A3 exhibits the
statistical results for Run 1 of the evolutionary-RRSA PD experiment. The sample size
for the entire Run was 35, indicating the total population of organizations, 17 of which
were bred as defectors and 18 were cooperators, as initial-cooperation was set to 50%.
The emissions-penalty and cooperation-reward sliders were set to zero, and the eliminateorganizations chooser was set to false. Run 1 ran for 50 time steps. All descriptive
statistics for the covariates resilience, robustness, sustainability, and the dependent
variable adaptive-capacity are reported below as found in Table A3. The model stopped
at net emissions of -16 tons, indicating an emissions credit, resulting in a robust state. The
emissions target was 5196 tons.
The PD payoff-matrix was
D
D -6, -6

C
206, -94

C -94, 206 56, 56
The Nash equilibrium analysis was as follows:
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(D, D) = (-6, -6) ≠ NE; Player 1 has an incentive to change his or her strategy to
cooperate, for a better payoff of -94, and Player 2 has incentive to change his or her
strategy to cooperate for a better payoff of -94.
(D, C) = (206, -94) ≠ NE; Player 1 has an incentive to change his or her strategy
to cooperate for a better payoff of 56. Player 2 has no incentive to change his or her
strategy.
(C, D) = (-94, 206) ≠ NE; Player 2 has an incentive to change his or her strategy
to cooperate for a better payoff of 56, while Player 1 has no incentive to change his or her
strategy.
(C, C) = (56, 56) = NE; Player 1 has no incentive to change his or her strategy,
and Player 2 has no incentive to change his or her strategy.
Using regression analysis performed in Excel, the following relationship for
defection was deduced:
Y = 4.492 –

@

Ln(x1)^2 + 5.34x2 + 0.182x3;

where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p values for all covariates were less than 0.05
with an F statistic of 55.066, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected, and
the covariate resilience was exponentially negatively correlated with adaptive-capacity
for defection, while robustness and sustainability were positively correlated with
adaptive-capacity for defection within the evolutionary-RRSA PD scenario for
population size of 35, when emission-penalties and cooperation-rewards are set to zero.
The R2 statistic, or coefficient of determination was 0.785, which indicated that the data
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fit the regression model for the evolutionary-RRSA PD for defection with the constraints
specified for this Run and explained 78.5% of the variance, as shown in Figures A2, A3,
A4, and A5.
For cooperation, the relationship was
Y = 27.379 + 0.155x1 - 0.074Ln(x3 - x2)
where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p values for all covariates were less than 0.05
with an F statistic of 1404.69, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected and
that resilience was positively correlated with adaptive capacity for cooperation in contrast
to the exponential negative correlation of resilience with adaptive-capacity for defection.
Robustness and sustainability were negatively correlated with adaptive-capacity for
cooperation within the evolutionary-RRSA PD scenario for a population size of 35, when
emission-penalties and cooperation-rewards are set to zero. The R2 statistic, or coefficient
of determination was 0.984, indicating that the data fit the regression model for all
covariates for cooperation within the evolutionary-RRSA PD and explained 98.4% of the
variance around the mean with the constraints specified for this Run.
For the covariate resilience, defined as the amplitude of organizational deviation
tolerance possible before returning to the expected emissions target and measured in tons,
for defection within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation (Run 1) the range, which is
the difference between the maximum (max) statistic of -25.294 and the minimum (min)
statistic of -60.399, is 35.106. as exhibited in Table A3. The defection mean for the
covariate resilience located in Table A3 of -42.847 represents the average of all score
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values calculated using the formula: (∑𝑋)/N, where sigma is the sum of X or raw scores,
all divided by N or the sample size of 35. Table A3 shows the standard deviation of
24.824, which is calculated using the formula s= ∑𝑆𝑆, where s is the standard deviation
and ∑𝑆𝑆 is the square root of the sum of squares. The median is a statistic of central
tendency that divides the sample into exactly half (Bryman, 2012), the value of which is 42.847 for this variable. Furthermore, the mode is a statistic of central tendency that
represents the value of a score or scores that present in the sample with the greatest
frequency (Lomax & Hahs-Vaughn, 2013). For the metric variable resilience, the modes
for defection exhibited in Table A3 were -60.399 and -25.294. In contrast, the max, min,
and range statistics for cooperation were 8,200, 7,800, and 400 respectively, with a mean
of 8,000, standard deviation of 282.843, and modes of 2,800 and 8,200, indicating
significantly greater resilience for cooperation than defection for the covariate resilience
as a function of adaptive-capacity within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation for Run
1. The mean for overall system resilience for the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation was
3978.577 for Run 1.
For the covariate robustness, defined as the measure of organizational stability in
meeting the emissions target despite environmental perturbations, measured on a sliding
scale from 0 (not robust) to 1 (fully robust), the max, min, range, and mean for defection
within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation for Run 1 are 0.797, 0.594, 0.247, and
0.673 respectively, with a median of 0.673 as shown in Table A3, in contrast to the
former statistics for cooperation being 1, 1, 0, 1, and 1, indicating that the cooperation
stratagem is fully robust compared to the defection stratagem, which achieves only partial
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robustness for Run 1. The mean for overall system robustness for the evolutionary-RRSA
PD simulation was 0.837 for Run 1.
For the covariate sustainability, defined as the length of time the system can
remain resilient, measured in time steps the max, min, range, and mean for defection and
cooperation within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation for Run 1 are 27, 26, 1, and
26.5 respectively, with a median of 26.5 as shown in Table A3. The mean for overall
system sustainability for the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation was 26.5 for Run 1.
For the dependent variable adaptive-capacity, defined as the quantitative increase
in complicated dynamics, emergent self-organized behavior, and information processing
ability, measured on a sliding scale from 0 (not robust) to 1 (fully robust), the max, min,
range, and mean for defection within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation for Run 1
are 84, 79, 5, and 8 respectively with a median of 81.5 as shown in Table A3, in contrast
to the former statistics for cooperation being 182, 178, 4, 180 and 180, indicating that the
cooperation stratagem results in greater adaptive-capacity compared to the defection
stratagem. The mean for overall system adaptive-capacity for the evolutionary-RRSA PD
simulation was 130.75 for Run 1.
Table A4 includes the statistical results for Run 2 of the evolutionary-RRSA
experiment. The sample size for the entire Run was 100, indicating the total population of
organizations, 50 of which were bred as defectors and 50 were cooperators, as initialcooperation was set to 50%. The emissions-penalty and cooperation-reward sliders were
set to zero, and the eliminate-organizations chooser was set to false. Run 2 of the
evolutionary-RRSA simulation ran for 17 time steps.
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The PD payoff-matrix was:
D
D 20, 20

C
155, -96

C -96, 155 54, 54
Nash equilibrium analysis
(D, D) = (20, 20) ≠ NE; Player 1 has an incentive to change their strategy to
cooperate, for a better payoff of -96, and Player 2 has incentive to change their strategy to
cooperate for a better payoff of -96.
(D, C) = (155, -96) ≠ NE; Player 1 has an incentive to change their strategy to
cooperate for a better payoff of 54. Player 2 has no incentive to change their strategy.
(C, D) = (-96, 155) ≠ NE; Player 2 has an incentive to change their strategy to
cooperate for a better payoff of 54, while Player 1 has no incentive to change their
strategy.
(C, C) = (54, 54) = NE; Player 1 has no incentive to change their strategy, and
player 2 has no incentive to change their strategy.
Using regression analysis performed in Excel the following relationship for
defection was deduced:
Y = 0.07 + 0.069x13 + 5.12x2 + 0.323x3;
where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 186.04, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
and that all covariates were positively correlated with adaptive capacity for defection
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when population size was increased to 100 within the evolutionary-RRSA PD scenario
with zero emission-penalties. The R2 statistic, or coefficient of determination was 0.925,
which indicated that the data fit the regression model for all covariates for defection
within the evolutionary-RRSA PD and explained 92.5% of the variance around the mean
with the constraints specified for this Run.
The relationship for cooperation for Run 2 of the evolutionary-RRSA PD was:
Ln(Y) = 2.236 +

@

0.324x1 - 3.768Ln((x3 – x2)2);

At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 186.04, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
and that resilience was positively correlated with adaptive capacity, whereas robustness
and sustainability were negatively correlated with the latter for cooperation when
population size was increased to 100 within the evolutionary-RRSA PD scenario with
zero emission-penalties. The R2 statistic, or coefficient of determination was 0.778, which
indicated that the data fit the regression model for all covariates for cooperation within
the evolutionary-RRSA PD and explained 77.8% of the variance around the mean with
the constraints specified for this Run.
Resilience (x1) Run 2. For the covariate resilience, the max, min, range, and mean
for defection within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation for Run 2 are -10.502, 20.116, 9.614, and -15.309 respectively with a median of -15.309 as shown in Table A4,
in contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 6700, 6700, 0, 6700 and 6700,
indicating significantly greater resilience for cooperation than defection for the covariate
resilience as a function of adaptive-capacity within the evolutionary-RRSA PD

110
simulation. The mean for overall system resilience for the evolutionary-RRSA PD
simulation was 3342.346 for Run 2.
Robustness (x2) Run 2. For the covariate robustness, the max, min, range, and
mean for defection within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation for Run 2 are 0.651,
0.357, 0.293, and 0.504 respectively with a median of 0.504 as shown in Table A4, in
contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 1, 1, 0, 1 and 1, indicating that the
cooperation stratagem is fully robust compared to the defection stratagem which achieves
only partial robustness in Run 2. The mean for overall system robustness for the
evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation was 0.752 or 75.2% for Run 2.
Sustainability (x3) Run 2. For the covariate sustainability, the max, min, range,
and mean for defection within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation for Run 2 are 17,
16, 1, and 16.5 respectively with a median of 16.5 as shown in Table A4, in contrast to
the former statistics for cooperation being 17, 17, 0, and 17 respectively with a median of
17 indicating that the system sustainability was increased by one time step as a result of
the cooperation stratagem. The mean for overall system sustainability for the
evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation was 16.75 for Run 2.
Adaptive-capacity (y) Run 2. For the dependent variable, adaptive-capacity, the
max, min, range, and mean for defection within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation
for Run 2 are 89, 81, 8, and 85 respectively with a median of 85 as shown in Table 4, in
contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 167, 167, 0, 167 and 167, indicating
that the cooperation stratagem results in greater and consistent adaptive-capacity
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compared to the defection stratagem. The mean for overall system adaptive-capacity for
the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation was 126 for Run 2.
Run 3. Table A5 exhibits the statistical results for Run 3 of the evolutionaryRRSA experiment. The sample size for the entire Run was 100, indicating the total
population of organizations, 50 of which were bred as defectors and 50 were cooperators,
as initial-cooperation was set to 50%. The emissions-penalty and cooperation-reward
sliders were set to 20 and zero respectively; and the eliminate-organizations chooser was
set to false. Run 3 of the evolutionary-RRSA simulation ran for 50 time steps. The PD
payoff-matrix was
D

C

D 13, 13

0, -98

C -98, 0

52, 52

Nash equilibrium analysis
(D, D) = (13, 13) ≠ NE; Player 1 has an incentive to change their strategy to
cooperate, for a better payoff of -98, and Player 2 has incentive to change their strategy to
cooperate for a better payoff of -98.
(D, C) = (0, -98) = NE; neither players have an incentive to change their
strategies.
(C, D) = (-98, 0) = NE; neither players have an incentive to change their
strategies.

112
(C, C) = (52, 52) ≠ NE; Player 1 has an incentive to change their strategy to
defect for a better payoff of 0, and Player 2 has an incentive to change their strategy to
defect for a better payoff of 0.
Regression analysis was performed in Excel for the application of an emissionspenalty to the simulation holding all other parameters constant, and the following
relationship for defection was deduced:
Ln(Y) = 1.339 –

@

0.861x1 + 0.289Ln(x3 - x2);

where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 59.755, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
and that resilience was negatively correlated with adaptive capacity for defection when
emissions-penalty was applied, whereas robustness and sustainability were positively
correlated with adaptive-capacity because of the emissions-penalty for defection within
the evolutionary-RRSA PD scenario. The R2 statistic, or coefficient of determination was
0.804, which indicated that the data fit the regression model for all covariates for
defection within the evolutionary-RRSA PD and explained 80.4% of the variance around
the mean with the constraints specified for this Run.
The relationship for cooperation for Run 3 of the evolutionary-RRSA PD was:
Y = 13.872 + 10.329Ln(x1) + 2.723Ln(x3 – x2);
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 1168.764, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
and that all covariates were positively correlated with adaptive capacity for cooperation
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when the emissions-penalty was applied, within the evolutionary-RRSA PD scenario.
The R2 statistic, or coefficient of determination was 0.987, which indicated that the data
fit the regression model for all covariates for cooperation within the evolutionary-RRSA
PD and explained 98.7% of the variance around the mean with the constraints specified
for this Run.
Resilience (x1) Run 3. For the covariate resilience, the max, min, range, and mean
for defection within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation for Run 3 are -19.878, 28.274, 8.396, and -24.076 respectively with a median of -24.077 as shown in Table A5,
in contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 5400, 5400, 0, 5400 and 5400,
indicating significantly greater and consistent resilience for cooperation than defection
for the covariate resilience as a function of adaptive-capacity within the evolutionaryRRSA PD simulation Run 3. The mean for overall system resilience for the evolutionaryRRSA PD simulation was 2687.962 for Run 3.
Robustness (x2) Run 3. For the covariate robustness, the max, min, range, and
mean for defection within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation for Run 3 are 0.271,
0.162, 0.109, and 0.217 respectively with a median of 0.217 as shown in Table A5, in
contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 1, 1, 0, 1, and 1, indicating that the
cooperation stratagem is fully robust compared to the defection stratagem which achieves
only partial robustness in Run 3. The mean for overall system robustness for the
evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation was 0.608 for Run 3.
Sustainability (x3) Run 3. For the covariate sustainability, the max, min, range,
and mean for defection within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation for Run 3 were 49,
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37, 12, and 43 respectively with a median of 43 as shown in Table A5, in contrast to the
former statistics for cooperation being 49, 49, 0, and 49 respectively with a median of 49
indicating that system sustainability was increased by 3 time steps because of the
cooperation stratagem. The mean for overall system sustainability for the evolutionaryRRSA PD simulation was 46 for Run 3.
Adaptive-capacity (y) Run 3. For the dependent variable, adaptive-capacity, the
max, min, range, and mean for defection within the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation
for Run 3 are 24, -3, 27, and 10.5 respectively with a median of 10.5 as shown in Table
A5, in contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 154, 154, 0, 154, and 154,
indicating that the cooperation stratagem results in greater and consistent adaptivecapacity compared to the defection stratagem. The mean for overall system adaptivecapacity for the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation was 82.25 for Run 3.
Evolutionary-Tit-for-Tat PD Simulation Experiment
Run 1. Table A7 exhibits the statistical results for Run 1 of the evolutionary-TfT
experiment. The sample size for the entire Run was 35, indicating the total population of
organizations, 17 of which were bred as defectors and 18 were cooperators, as initialcooperation was set to 50%. The emissions-penalty and cooperation-reward sliders were
set to 0 and 0 respectively; and the eliminate-organizations chooser was set to false. Run
1 of the evolutionary-TfT simulation ran for 50 time steps with net emissions of 62545
tons exceeding the emissions target of 5183 tons, resulting in organizational collapse. The
PD payoff-matrix was
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D

C

D 796, 796

N/A

C N/A

2582, 2582

Nash equilibrium analysis
(D, D) = (796, 769) = NE; neither player can change their strategy.
(D, C) = (N/A, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid option as Player 1 cannot chose to
defect against a cooperator, and similarly for Player 2.
(C, D) = (N/A, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid option as Player 1 cannot chose to
cooperate against a defector, and similarly for Player 2.
(C, C) = (2582, 2582) = NE; neither player can change their strategy.
Using regression analysis performed in Excel the following relationship for
defection was deduced:
Y = -20984 + 7.858x1 + 1494.064x2 – 28.097x3;
where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 241.036, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
and the covariates resilience and robustness were positively correlated with adaptivecapacity for defection, while sustainability was negatively correlated with adaptivecapacity for defection within the evolutionary-TFT PD scenario for population size of 35,
when emission-penalties and cooperation-rewards are set to zero. The R2 statistic, or
coefficient of determination was 0.957, which indicated that the data fit the regression
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model for the evolutionary-TFT PD for defection with the constraints specified for this
Run, and explained 95.7% of the variance, as shown in Figures A18, A19, A20, and A21.
For cooperation, the relationship was
Y = 3.046 + 2.303x1 + 0.015x12 + 1392.312x24 + 33.261x3
where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 10504.81, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
and that resilience and robustness are exponentially positively correlated with adaptive
capacity for cooperation in contrast to the linear correlation of resilience and robustness
with adaptive-capacity for defection, and sustainability was positively correlated with
adaptive-capacity for cooperation within the evolutionary-TFT PD scenario for
population size of 35, when emission-penalties and cooperation-rewards are set to zero,
as seen in Figures A18, A19, A20, and A21. The R2 statistic, or coefficient of
determination was 0.998, indicating that the data fit the regression model for all
covariates for cooperation within the evolutionary-TFT PD and explained 99.8% of the
variance around the mean with the constraints specified for this Run.
Resilience (x1) Run 1. For the covariate resilience, the max, min, range, and mean
for defection within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation for Run 1 are -11.275, -99.528,
88.253, and -70.597 respectively with a median of -99.496 as shown in Table A7, in
contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 12800, 11300, 1500, 11984.615,
and 11900, indicating significantly greater resilience for cooperation than defection for
the covariate resilience as a function of adaptive-capacity within the evolutionary-TfT
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PD simulation Run 1. The mean for overall system resilience for the evolutionary-TfT
PD simulation was 5840.845 for Run 1.
Robustness (x2) Run 1. For the covariate robustness, the max, min, range, and
mean for defection within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation for Run 1 are 0.338,
0.054, 0.284, and 0.243 respectively with a median of 0.325 as shown in Table A7, in
contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 1, 1, 0, 1, and 1, indicating that the
cooperation stratagem is fully robust compared to the defection stratagem which achieves
only partial robustness in Run 1. The mean for overall system robustness for the
evolutionary-TfT PD simulation was 0.611 for Run 1.
Sustainability (x3) Run 1. For the covariate sustainability, the max, min, range,
and mean for defection and cooperation within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation for
Run 1 were 6, 6, 0, and 6 respectively with a median of 6 as shown in Table A7. The
mean for overall system sustainability for the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation was 6 for
Run 1.
Adaptive-capacity (x4) Run 1. For the dependent variable, adaptive-capacity, the
max, min, range, and mean for defection within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation for
Run 1 are -96, -113, 17, and -104.5 respectively with a median of -104.5 as shown in
Table A7, in contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 228, 213, 15, 219.846,
and 219, indicating that the cooperation stratagem results in greater adaptive-capacity
compared to the defection stratagem. The mean for overall system adaptive-capacity for
the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation was 53.6 for Run 1.
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Run 2. Table A8 exhibits the statistical results for Run 2 of the evolutionary-TfT
experiment. The sample size for the entire Run was 100, indicating the total population of
organizations, 50 of which were bred as defectors and 50 were cooperators, as initialcooperation was set to 50%. The emissions-penalty and cooperation-reward sliders were
set to 0 and 0 respectively; and the eliminate-organizations chooser was set to false. Run
2 of the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation ran for 50 time steps. The model stopped when
the net emissions of 494950 tons exceeded the emissions target of 15134 tons, resulting
in organizational collapse. The PD payoff-matrix was
D

C

D 2640, 2640

N/A

C N/A

7640, 7640

Nash equilibrium analysis:
(D, D) = (2640, 2640) = NE; neither player can change their strategy.
(D, C) = (N/A, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid option as Player 1 cannot chose to
defect against a cooperator, and similarly for Player 2.
(C, D) = (N/A, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid option as Player 1 cannot chose to
cooperate against a defector, and similarly for Player 2.
(C, C) = (7640, 7640) = NE; neither player can change their strategy.
Regression analysis performed in Excel revealed the following relationship for
defection:
Y = -265.228 + 0.818x1 + 17.794x23 + 0.148x33
where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
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At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 728.796, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
and all covariates were positively correlated with adaptive-capacity for defection, as a
result of the population size increasing to 100 from 35 in the previous Run within the
evolutionary-TFT PD, when emission-penalties and cooperation-rewards are set to zero.
The R2 statistic, or coefficient of determination was 0.979, which indicated that the data
fit the regression model for the evolutionary-TFT PD for defection with the constraints
specified for this Run, and explained 97.9% of the variance, as shown in Figures A20,
A21, A22, and A23.
For cooperation, the relationship was
Y = -1.064 + 1.039x1 – 1.276Ln((x3 - x2)5)
where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 1530.037, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
and that resilience was positively correlated with adaptive capacity for cooperation, while
robustness, and sustainability were exponentially negatively correlated with adaptivecapacity with population size increased from 35 to 100 for cooperation within the
evolutionary-TFT PD scenario when emission-penalties and cooperation-rewards are set
to zero, as seen in Figures A20, A21, A22, and A23. The R2 statistic, or coefficient of
determination was 0.985, indicating that the data fit the regression model for all
covariates for cooperation within the evolutionary-TFT PD and explained 98.5% of the
variance around the mean with the constraints specified for this Run.
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Resilience (x1) Run 2. For the covariate resilience, the max, min, range, and mean
for defection within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation for Run 2 are -21.635, -99.502,
77.867, and -77.037 respectively with a median of -99.444 as shown in Table A8, in
contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 19900, 12900, 7000, 16443.636,
and 16500, indicating significantly greater resilience for cooperation than defection for
the covariate resilience as a function of adaptive-capacity within the evolutionary-TfT
PD simulation Run 2. The mean for overall system resilience for the evolutionary-TfT
PD simulation was 11878.199 for Run 2.
Robustness (x2) Run 2. For the covariate robustness, the max, min, range, and
mean for defection within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation for Run 2 are 0.364,
0.099, 0.265, and 0.281 respectively with a median of 0.340 as shown in Table A8, in
contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 1, 1, 0, 1, and 1, indicating that the
cooperation stratagem is fully robust compared to the defection stratagem which achieves
only partial robustness in Run 2. The mean for overall system robustness for the
evolutionary-TfT PD simulation was 0.806 for Run 2.
Sustainability (x3) Run 2. For the covariate sustainability, the max, min, range,
and mean for defection and cooperation within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation for
Run 2 are 2, 2, 0, and 2 respectively with a median of 2 as shown in Table A8. The mean
for overall system sustainability for the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation was 2 for Run 2.
Adaptive-capacity (x4) Run 2. For the dependent variable, adaptive-capacity, the
max, min, range, and mean for defection within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation for
Run 2 are -74, -100, 26, and -87 respectively with a median of -87 as shown in Table A8,
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in contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 229, 229, 70, 264.436, and 265,
indicating that the cooperation stratagem results in greater adaptive-capacity compared to
the defection stratagem. The mean for overall system adaptive-capacity for the
evolutionary-TfT PD simulation was 168.5 for Run 2.
Run 3. Table A9 exhibits the statistical results for Run 3 of the evolutionary-TfT
experiment. The sample size for the entire Run was 100, indicating the total population of
organizations, 50 of which were bred as defectors and 50 were cooperators, as initialcooperation was set to 50%. The emissions-penalty and cooperation-reward sliders were
set to 20 and 0 respectively; and the eliminate-organizations chooser was set to false.
Run 3 of the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation ran for 50 time steps. The model stopped
when net emissions of 9708900 tons exceeded the emissions-target of 14912 tons
resulting in organizational collapse. The PD payoff-matrix was
D
D 476, 476

C
N/A

C N/A
7476, 7476
Nash equilibrium analysis:
(D, D) = (476, 476) = NE; neither player can change their strategy.
(D, C) = (N/A, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid option as Player 1 cannot chose to
defect against a cooperator, and similarly for Player 2.
(C, D) = (N/A, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid option as Player 1 cannot chose to
cooperate against a defector, and similarly for Player 2.
(C, C) = (7476, 7476) = NE; neither player can change their strategy.
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Using regression analysis performed in Excel, the following relationship was
deduced for defection:
Y = -3624.586 + 1.335x1 – 107.749x23 + 0.323x33;
where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 604.567, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
and that resilience, and sustainability were positively correlated with adaptive-capacity,
while robustness was exponentially negatively correlated with the latter as a result of the
emissions-penalty for defection within the evolutionary-TFT PD scenario for population
size of 100, when emission-penalties were set to 20 and cooperation-rewards were set to
zero. The R2 statistic, or coefficient of determination was 0.988, indicating that the data
fit the multiple regression model for all covariates, and explained 98.8% of the variability
around the mean for defection within the evolutionary-TFT PD with the constraints
specified for this Run, as shown in Figures A24, A25, A26, and A27.
The relationship for cooperation was
Y = -2180.815 + 1.182x1 + 46322.029x2 + 0.345x33;
where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 500.819, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
and all covariates were positively correlated with adaptive-capacity for cooperation as a
result of the emissions-penalty leaving all other parameters constant for the evolutionaryTFT PD scenario for population size of 100, when emission-penalties are set to 20 and
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cooperation-rewards are set to zero. The R2 statistic, or coefficient of determination was
0.970, indicating the data fit the regression model for all covariates, and explained 97%
of the variability around the means for the evolutionary-TFT PD with the constraints
specified for this Run, as shown in Figures A24, A25, A26, and A27.
Resilience (x1) Run 3. For the covariate resilience, the max, min, range, and mean
for defection within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation for Run 3 are -37.918, -100.721,
62.803, and -76.703 respectively with a median of -90.497 as shown in Table A9, in
contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 200, 100, 200, 188, and 200,
indicating significantly greater resilience for cooperation than defection for the covariate
resilience as a function of adaptive-capacity within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation
Run 3. The mean for overall system resilience for the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation
was 49.115 for Run 3.
Robustness (x2) Run 3. For the covariate robustness, the max, min, range, and
mean for defection within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation for Run 3 are 0.079,
0.023, 0.056, and 0.048 respectively with a median of 0.046 as shown in Table A9, in
contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 1, 1, 0, 1, and 1, indicating that the
cooperation stratagem is fully robust compared to the defection stratagem which achieves
only partial robustness in Run 3. The mean for overall system robustness for the
evolutionary-TfT PD simulation was 0.505 for Run 3.
Sustainability (x3) Run 3. For the covariate sustainability, the max, min, range,
and mean for defection and cooperation within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation for
Run 3 are -1, -1, 0, and -1 respectively with a median of -1 as shown in Table A9. The
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mean for overall system sustainability for the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation was -1 for
Run 3.
Adaptive-capacity (x4) Run 3. For the dependent variable, adaptive-capacity, the
max, min, range, and mean for defection within the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation for
Run 3 are -979, -1999, 1020, and -1489 respectively with a median of -1489 as shown in
Table A9, in contrast to the former statistics for cooperation being 102, 101, 1, 101.88,
and 102, indicating that the cooperation stratagem results in greater adaptive-capacity
compared to the defection stratagem. The mean for overall system adaptive-capacity for
the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation was -725.39 for Run 3.
Repeated-cooperate PD Simulation Experiment
Run 1. Table A11 exhibits the statistical results for Run 1 of the repeatedcooperate PD experiment. The sample size for the entire Run was 35, indicating the total
population of organizations, 17 of which were bred as defectors and 18 were cooperators,
as initial-cooperation was set to 50% The emissions-penalty and cooperation-reward
sliders were set to 0 and 0 respectively; and the eliminate-organizations chooser was set
to false. Run 1 of the repeated-cooperate PD simulation ran for 50 time steps. The model
stopped at net emissions of -102 tons. The emissions-target was 5027 tons, resulting in an
emissions credit. The PD payoff-matrix was
D

C

D N/A, N/A

N/A, -111

C -111, N/A

2488, 2488

Nash equilibrium analysis:
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(D, D) = (N/A, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as defection is not an
option in this Run.
(D, C) = (N/A, -111) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as defection is not an
option in this Run.
(C, D) = (-111, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as defection is not an
option in this Run.
(C, C) = (2488, 2488) = NE; neither player can change their strategy.
Using regression analysis performed in Excel, the following relationship
for cooperation was deduced:
Ln(Y) = 4.151+

@

0.35x1 + 0.05Ln((x3 – x2)2);

where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 370.985, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
and all covariates were positively correlated with adaptive-capacity as seen in Figures
A34, A35, A36, and A37 for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD scenario for
population size of 35, when emission-penalties and cooperation-reward were set to 0. The
R2 statistic, or coefficient of determination was 0.940, which indicated that the data fit the
regression model for all covariates and explained 94.0% of the variability around the
means for the repeated-cooperate PD with the constraints specified for this Run.
Resilience (x1) Run 1. For the covariate resilience, the max, min, range, and mean
for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD simulation for Run 1 are 167.499, 74.311, 241.81, and 22.983 respectively with a median of 4.17 as shown in Table A11.
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Robustness (x2) Run 1. For the covariate robustness, the max, min, range, and
mean for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD simulation for Run 1 are 0.913,
0.432, 0.284, and 0.243 respectively with a median of 0.481 as shown in Table A11.
Sustainability (x3) Run 1. For the covariate sustainability, the max, min, range,
and mean for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD simulation for Run 1 are 49,
49, 0, and 49 respectively with a median of 49 as shown in Table A11.
Adaptive-capacity (x4) Run 1. For the dependent variable, adaptive-capacity, the
max, min, range, and mean for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD simulation
for Run 1 are 138, 51, 87, and 100.2 respectively with a median of 102 as shown in Table
A11, meaning that adaptive-capacity was higher for cooperation than for defection, as
reported below for the repeated-defect PD Run 1.
Run 2. Table A12 exhibits the statistical results for Run 2 of the repeatedcooperate PD experiment. The sample size for the entire Run was 100, indicating the
total population of organizations, 50 of which were bred as defectors and 50 were
cooperators, as initial-cooperation was set to 50% The emissions-penalty and
cooperation-reward sliders were set to 0 and 0 respectively; and the eliminateorganizations chooser was set to false. Run 2 of the repeated-cooperate PD simulation
ran for 50 time steps. The model stopped at net emissions of 804 tons. The emissionstarget was 15700 tons, resulting in a stable sustainable state. The PD payoff-matrix was
D

C

D N/A, N/A

N/A, 75

C 75, N/A

8204, 8204
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Nash equilibrium analysis
(D, D) = (N/A, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as defection is not an
option in this Run.
(D, C) = (N/A, 75) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as defection is not an
option in this Run.
(C, D) = (75, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as defection is not an
option in this Run.
(C, C) = (8204, 8204) = NE; neither player can change their strategy.
Using regression analysis performed in Excel, the following relationship for
cooperation was deduced with an increased population size:
Ln(Y) = 3.971 +

@

0.038x1 + 0.039Ln((x3 – x2)2);

where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 642.057, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
and an increase in population had no effect on the positive correlation between all
covariates with adaptive-capacity as deduced in Run 1 as seen in Figures A38, A39, A40,
and A41 for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD scenario for population size of
100, when emission-penalties and cooperation-reward were set to 0. The R2 statistic, or
coefficient of determination was 0.965, which indicated that the data fit the regression
model for all covariates and explained 96.5% of the variability around the means for the
repeated-cooperate PD with the constraints specified for this Run.
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Resilience (x1) Run 2. For the covariate resilience, the max, min, range, and mean
for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD simulation for Run 2 were 4600, 102.345, 4702.345, and 75.078 respectively with a median of 8.453 as shown in Table
A12.
Robustness (x2) Run 2. For the covariate robustness, the max, min, range, and
mean for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD simulation for Run 2 were 1,
0.421, 0.579, and 0.658 respectively with a median of 0.658 as shown in Table A12.
Sustainability (x3) Run 2. For the covariate sustainability, the max, min, range,
and mean for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD simulation for Run 2 were
45, 45, 0, and 45 respectively with a median of 45 as shown in Table A12.
Adaptive-capacity (x4) Run 2. For the dependent variable, adaptive-capacity, the
max, min, range, and mean for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD simulation
for Run 2 are 146, 47, 99, and 101.94 respectively with a median of 96 as shown in Table
A12.
Run 3. Table A13 exhibits the statistical results for Run 3 of the repeatedcooperate PD experiment. The sample size for the entire Run was 100, indicating the
total population of organizations, 50 of which were bred as defectors and 50 were
cooperators, as initial-cooperation was set to 50% The emissions-penalty and
cooperation-reward sliders were set to 20 and 0 respectively; and the eliminateorganizations chooser was set to false. Run 3 of the repeated-cooperate PD simulation
ran for 50 time steps. Run 3 yielded similar results to Run 2 of the repeated-cooperate PD
as the emissions-penalty applies only to defection. The model stopped at -41 tons of
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emissions, and the emissions-target was 14765 tons, resulting in an emissions credit of 41
tons. The PD payoff-matrix was:
D

C

D N/A, N/A

N/A, 153

C 153, N/A

7359, 7359

Nash equilibrium analysis
(D, D) = (N/A, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as defection is not an
option in this Run.
(D, C) = (N/A, 153) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as defection is not an
option in this Run.
(C, D) = (153, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as defection is not an
option in this Run.
(C, C) = (7359, 7359) = NE; neither player can change their strategy.
Using regression analysis performed in Excel, the following relationship for
applying an emissions-penalty to cooperative stratagems was deduced:
Ln(Y) = 4.109 +

@

0.037x1 + 0.054Ln((x3 – x2)2);

where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 361.082, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected.
All covariates were positively correlated with adaptive capacity and the emissionspenalty had no effect on the positive correlation deduced in Runs 1 and 2 above as seen
in Figures A42, A43, A44, and A45 for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD
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scenario for population size of 100, when emission-penalties and cooperation-reward
were set to 0. The R2 statistic, or coefficient of determination was 0.938, which indicated
that the data fit the regression model for all covariates and explained 93.8% of the
variability around the means for the repeated-cooperate PD with the constraints specified
for this Run.
Resilience (x1) Run 3. For the covariate resilience, the max, min, range, and mean
for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD simulation for Run 3 were 271.922, 107.594, 379.516, and 11.1 respectively with a median of -0.623 as shown in Table A13.
Robustness (x2) Run 3. For the covariate robustness, the max, min, range, and
mean for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD simulation for Run 3 were 0.924,
0.401, 0.523, and 0.638 respectively with a median of 0.642 as shown in Table A13.
Sustainability (x3) Run 3. For the covariate sustainability, the max, min, range,
and mean for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD simulation for Run 3 were
49, 49, 0, and 49 respectively with a median of 49 as shown in Table A13.
Adaptive-capacity (x4) Run 3. For the dependent variable, adaptive-capacity, the
max, min, range, and mean for cooperation within the repeated-cooperate PD simulation
for Run 3 were 149, 51, 98, and 99.11 respectively with a median of 99.5 as shown in
Table A13.
Repeated-defect PD Simulation Experiment
Run 1. Table A15 exhibits the statistical results for Run 1 of the repeated-defect
PD experiment. The sample size for the entire Run was 35, indicating the total population
of organizations, 17 of which were bred as defectors and 18 were cooperators, as initial-
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cooperation was set to 50% The emissions-penalty and cooperation-reward sliders were
set to 0 and 0 respectively; and the eliminate-organizations chooser was set to false. Run
1 of the repeated-cooperate PD simulation ran for 50 time steps. Although the emissionstarget was 4973 tons, the model stopped at 3222 tons of emissions, due to the step
constraint of 50. The PD payoff-matrix was
D

C

D 805, 805

832, N/A

C N/A, 832

N/A

Nash equilibrium analysis:
(D, D) = (805, 805) = NE; neither player can change their strategy.
(D, C) = (832, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as cooperation is not
an option in this Run.
(C, D) = (N/A, 832) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as cooperation is not
an option in this Run.
(C, C) = (N/A, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as cooperation is not
an option in this Run.
Using regression analysis performed in Excel the following relationship for
defection was discovered for Run 1:
Ln(Y) = 5.464 – 0.034x1 – 6.591x2 – 0.078x3;
where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 210.941, which indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected
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and all covariates were negatively correlated with adaptive-capacity as seen in Figures
A50, A51, A52, and A53 for defection within the repeated-defect PD scenario for
population size of 35, when emission-penalties and cooperation-reward were set to 0. The
R2 statistic, or coefficient of determination was 0.932, which indicated that the data fit the
regression model for all covariates and explained 93.2% of the variability around the
means for the repeated-defect PD with the constraints specified for this Run.
Resilience (x1) Run 1. For the covariate resilience, the max, min, range, and mean
for defection within the repeated-defect PD simulation for Run 1 were -2.406, -3.943,
1.537, and -2.931 respectively with a median of -2.764 as shown in Table A15.
Robustness (x2) Run 1. For the covariate robustness, the max, min, range, and
mean for defection within the repeated-defect PD simulation for Run 1 were 0.072, 0.017,
0.055, and 0.036 respectively with a median of 0.028 as shown in Table A15.
Sustainability (x3) Run 1. For the covariate sustainability, the max, min, range,
and mean for defection within the repeated-defect PD simulation for Run 1 were 49, 49,
0, and 49 respectively with a median of 49 as shown in Table A15.
Adaptive-capacity (x4) Run 1. For the dependent variable, adaptive-capacity, the
max, min, range, and mean for defection within the repeated-defect PD simulation for
Run 1 were 49, -43, 92, and 6.914 respectively with a median of 6 as shown in Table
A15.
Run 2. Table A16 exhibits the statistical results for Run 2 of the repeated-defect
PD experiment. The sample size for the entire Run was 100, indicating the total
population of organizations, 50 of which were bred as defectors and 50 were cooperators,
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as initial-cooperation was set to 50% The emissions-penalty and cooperation-reward
sliders were set to 0 and 0 respectively; and the eliminate-organizations chooser was set
to false. Run 2 of the repeated-defect PD simulation ran for 50 time steps. Although the
emissions-target was 14780 tons, the model stopped at 9740 tons of emissions, due to the
step constraint of 50. The PD payoff-matrix was
D

C

D 2340, 2340

2224, N/A

C N/A, 2224

N/A, N/A

Nash equilibrium analysis:
(D, D) = (2340, 2340) = NE; neither player can change their strategy.
(D, C) = (2225, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as cooperation is not
an option in this Run.
(C, D) = (N/A, 2224) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as cooperation is not
an option in this Run.
(C, C) = (N/A, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as cooperation is not
an option in this Run.
Using regression analysis performed in Excel the following relationship for
defection was discovered:
Ln(Y) = 5.477 – 0.019x1 – 5.12x2 – 0.079x3;
where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 191.505, which indicated that null hypothesis was rejected and
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all covariates were negatively correlated with adaptive-capacity for defection within the
repeated-defect PD scenario for population size of 100, when emission-penalties and
cooperation-reward were set to 0, as shown in Figures 54, 55, 56, and 57. The increase in
population size from 35 in Run 1 to 100 in Run 2 had no effect on the relationship
between variables. The R2 statistic, or coefficient of determination was 0.925, which
indicated that the data fit the regression model for all covariates and explained 92.5% of
the variability around the means for the repeated-defect PD with the constraints specified
for this Run.
Resilience (x1) Run 2. For the covariate resilience, the max, min, range, and mean
for defection within the repeated-defect PD simulation for Run 2 were -2.396, -3.819,
1.423, and -2.85 respectively with a median of -2.733 as shown in Table A16.
Robustness (x2) Run 2. For the covariate robustness, the max, min, range, and
mean for defection within the repeated-defect PD simulation for Run 2 were 0.068, 0.017,
0.051, and 0.032 respectively with a median of 0.027 as shown in Table A16.
Sustainability (x3) Run 2. For the covariate sustainability, the max, min, range,
and mean for defection within the repeated-defect PD simulation for Run 2 were 49, 49,
0, and 49 respectively with a median of 49 as shown in Table A16.
Adaptive-capacity (x4) Run 2. For the dependent variable, adaptive-capacity, the
max, min, range, and mean for defection within the repeated-defect PD simulation for
Run 2 were 48, -48, 96, and 1.6 respectively with a median of 2.5 as shown in Table A16.
Run 3. Table A17 exhibits the statistical results for Run 3 of the repeated-defect
PD experiment. The sample size for the entire was 100, indicating the total population of
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organizations, 50 of which were bred as defectors and 50 were cooperators, as initialcooperation was set to 50% The emissions-penalty and cooperation-reward sliders were
set to 20 and 0 respectively; and the eliminate-organizations chooser was set to false.
Run 3 of the repeated-cooperate PD simulation ran for 50 time steps. The model stopped
at 103007 tons of emissions, which exceeded the emissions target of 14981 resulting in
organizational collapse. The PD payoff-matrix was
D

C

D 507, 507

3010, N/A

C N/A, 3010

N/A, N/A

Nash equilibrium analysis:
(D, D) = (507, 507) = NE; neither player can change their strategy.
(D, C) = (3010, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as cooperation is not
an option in this Run.
(C, D) = (N/A, 3010) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as cooperation is not
an option in this Run.
(C, C) = (N/A, N/A) ≠ NE; this is not a valid combination as cooperation is not
an option in this Run.
Using regression analysis performed in Excel the following relationship was
found for defection when an emissions-penalty was applied:
Y = -184.998 + 0.029x13 + 20.392.x23 + 0.08x33;
where x1 = resilience; x2 = robustness; and x3 = sustainability.
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At a confidence interval of 95%, the p-values for all covariates were less than
0.05 with an F-statistic of 912.56, which indicated that null hypothesis was rejected and
all covariates were positively correlated with adaptive-capacity for defection within the
repeated-defect PD scenario for population size of 100, when emission-penalties was set
to 20 and cooperation-reward was set to 0, as shown in Figures A58, A59, A60, and A61.
The emissions-penalty affected the negative relationship between covariates and
adaptive-capacity from Runs 1 and 2, which were positively correlated in Run 3. The R2
statistic, or coefficient of determination was 0.983, which indicated that the data fit the
regression model for all covariates and explained 98.3% of the variability around the
means for the repeated-defect PD with the constraints specified for this Run.
Resilience (x1) Run 3. For the covariate resilience, the max, min, range, and mean
for defection within the repeated-defect PD simulation for Run 3 were -20.909, -31.563,
10.654, and -23.935 respectively with a median of -23.553 as shown in Table A17.
Robustness (x2) Run 3. For the covariate robustness, the max, min, range, and
mean for defection within the repeated-defect PD simulation for Run 3 were 0.205, 0.091,
0.114, and 0.127 respectively with a median of 0.119 as shown in Table A17.
Sustainability (x3) Run 3. For the covariate sustainability, the max, min, range,
and mean for defection within the repeated-defect PD simulation for Run 3 were -5, -5, 0,
and -5 respectively with a median of -5 as shown in Table A17.
Adaptive-capacity (x4) Run 3. For the dependent variable, adaptive-capacity, the
max, min, range, and mean for defection within the repeated-defect PD simulation for
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Run 3 were -20, -119, 99, and -69.81 respectively with a median of -73 as shown in Table
A17.
Summary
The null hypothesis was rejected for all Runs of the evolutionary-RRSA PD,
evolutionary-TfT PD, repeated-cooperate PD and repeated-defect PD. Resilience was
negatively correlated with adaptive-capacity for defection, and positively correlated with
the latter for cooperation in Run 1 of the evolutionary-RRSA PD. Within the same Run,
robustness and sustainability were positively correlated with adaptive-capacity for
defection, and negatively correlated with the latter for cooperation. For Run 2 of
evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation an increase in population size from 35 to 100
organizations resulted in all covariates being positively correlated with adaptive-capacity
for defection, while the relationship between variables remained the same as Run 1 for
cooperation. Application of the emissions-penalty, keeping all other parameters constant
in Run 3 of the evolutionary-RRSA PD simulation, kept correlation between variables for
defection as negative, whereas for cooperation all covariates became positively correlated
with adaptive-capacity.
For Run 1 of the evolutionary-TfT PD resilience and robustness were positively
correlated with adaptive-capacity for defection, while sustainability was negatively
correlated with adaptive-capacity for defection, in contrast to all covariates being
positively polynomially correlated with adaptive-capacity for cooperation. Population
increase in Run 2 resulted in positive correlation between all covariates and adaptivecapacity for defection while, robustness, and sustainability were exponentially negatively
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correlated with adaptive-capacity for cooperation in Run 2 of the Evolutionary-TfT PD.
For Run 3 of the evolutionary-TfT PD simulation the emissions-penalty had the effect of
negatively correlating robustness with adaptive-capacity for defection and positively
correlating all covariates with adaptive-capacity for cooperation.
For Runs 1, and 2 of the repeated-defect PD simulation, the covariates were
negatively correlated with adaptive-capacity. Application of an emissions-penalty to the
repeated-defect PD simulation resulted in the positive correlation between all covariates
and adaptive-capacity in Run 3. For the repeated-cooperate PD simulation all covariates
were positively correlated with adaptive-capacity for all Runs. With respect to the NE
analyses, for the evolutionary-RRSA PD, the NE for Runs 1 and 2 were mutual
cooperation, whereas for Run 3, 2 NE were found; defect-against-cooperator and
cooperate-against-defector (4 NE in total for this strategy). For the evolutionary-TfT PD,
2 NE were found per Run (6 NE in total for this strategy), these being mutual defection
and mutual cooperation. For the repeated-cooperate PD the NE for all Runs was mutual
cooperation (3 NE in total for this strategy), and for the repeated-defect PD the NE was
mutual defection for all Runs (3 NE in total for this strategy). The evolutionary-TfT PD
produced the highest net emissions per Run, followed by the repeated-defect PD. The
evolutionary-RRSA PD produced the lowest net emissions followed by the repeatedcooperate PD. These findings are discussed in relation to the nature, purpose, and reason
for conducting the study in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this simulation study was to develop a management framework of
RRSA for organizational regimes involved in climate governance viewed as complex
systems to transcend the current unsustainable state, using a quantitative computational
simulation approach. An evolutionary game theory approach to ABMS, using an
originally developed evolutionary PD simulation on the NetLogo platform to generate the
data and statistical modeling in Excel tested the hypothesis that a positive relationship
exists between resilience, robustness, and sustainability as independent variables and the
dependent variable of adaptive capacity.
The data generated in Netlogo were analyzed in Excel using regression analysis,
with the goal of optimizing the R2 and F statistics, while minimizing p values of all
covariates. The null hypothesis was rejected; thus, the covariates resilience, robustness,
and sustainability were positively correlated with adaptive-capacity for iterated
consecutive cooperative stratagems (repeated-cooperate PD), while the former covariates
were negatively correlated with adaptive-capacity for iterated consecutive defective
stratagems (repeated-defect PD) in the absence of an emissions-penalty. Application of
an emissions-penalty to iterated consecutive defective stratagems resulted in positive
correlation between covariates and adaptive-capacity. All covariates were positively
correlated with adaptive-capacity in Run 3 of the evolutionary-RRSA PD for both
cooperation and defection, while for the evolutionary-TfT PD all covariates were only
positively correlated with adaptive-capacity in Run 3 for cooperation. In terms of game
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theory, several PD NE were found. These findings were used to formulate the
recommended RRSA framework discussed below.
Interpretation of Findings
Axelrod (1984) found that the TfT PD outperformed all other strategies for
reciprocal altruism, using the scoring method for payoffs described in Chapter 4. While
the objective of this study was not to test the efficacy of strategies for reciprocal altruism,
a secondary finding, based on analysis of both payoffs and net emissions as indicators of
reciprocal altruism, was that the evolutionary-RRSA PD outperformed all other
strategies, including the evolutionary-TfT PD for reciprocal altruism. Axelrod used a
discount parameter in his experiments, which is comparable to the emissions-penalty
used in this study. Axelrod further stated that continued interaction, depending on the
magnitude of his discount parameter, was a necessary but not sufficient condition for
cooperation to emerge. The finding that the covariates robustness and sustainability were
negatively correlated with adaptive capacity in Run 2 of the evolutionary-TfT PD
simulation but became positively correlated with adaptive-capacity in Run 3 corroborates
Axelrod’s latter finding, as Run 3 included the emissions-penalty. Both Runs 2 and 3 ran
for 50 time steps, which substantiated that extended interaction is not sufficient for
cooperation to emerge; however, the combination of the emissions-penalty with extended
interaction in Run 3 provided the necessary initial conditions for cooperation to emerge.
While Axelrod’s experiments on the theory of cooperation using computer simulated PD
strategies were based on game theory, he did not discuss the NE of any of the games

141
played in his tournaments. As NE is integral to game theory, in this study, I expanded on
the work of Axelrod by including analyses of the NE for each Run.
In current literature, as discussed in Chapter 2, Tosun and Schoenefeld (2017)
discussed that coordination of collective action into cooperation was one of the
challenges of PD PGGs, which I both confirmed and extended upon. While defection
served as a fixed-point attractor for most Runs of all PD simulations except the iterated
consecutive cooperation PD, application of an emissions-penalty to all strategy types
(evolutionary-RRSA PD, evolutionary-TfT PD, repeated-defect PD, and repeatedcooperate PD), the latter being the exception, resulted in coordination of collective
action, consisting of both cooperative and defective decision types, towards increased
adaptive-capacity.
Hurlstone et al. (2017) further substantiated the role of collective action in
successful climate negotiations, for mitigating the problems of free-riding and the tragedy
of the commons associated with PGGs and opined that the only PD Nash equilibrium was
mutual defection, known as the paradox of cooperation (Adami et al., 2016). The NE
analyses presented in Chapter 4 for each Run indicated that mutual cooperation was a NE
for the Evolutionary-RRSA PD in Runs 1 and 2, while defection against a cooperator and
cooperation against a defector were the NEs for Run 3 of the Evolutionary-RRSA PD.
For the evolutionary-TfT PD, both mutual defection and mutual cooperation were NEs,
whereas mutual cooperation was the only NE for the iterated consecutive cooperate PD,
and mutual defection was the only NE for the iterated consecutive defect PD. Interpreted
through the lenses of complexity theory and game theory, these findings imply that the
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problems of free-riding and the tragedy of the commons can be mitigated in the absence
of central control, given that the parameters, which can be thought of as fostering
adaptive-capacity, serve as the initial conditions, which then give rise to the emergence
and evolution of strategies that maximize payoffs with respect to adaptive-capacity.
While Adami et al. (2016), and Hurlstone et al. (2017) emphasized the importance of the
coordination of collective action into cooperation, it might be too naïve and idealistic a
goal, as defection is inherent in all PD PGG strategies and constitutes the NE for many
types of PD PGGs.
The evolutionary-RRSA PD showed that the goal of steering global temperatures
away from a 2℃ increase by 2050 (Cole, 2015) can be facilitated through combinations
of cooperative and defective actions given the appropriate initial conditions, which herein
after will be referred to as RRSA climate negotiations. The following primary deductions
from this study were used to generate the evolutionary RRSA management framework, as
shown in Figure A50, which may be used by climate governance leaders, negotiators, and
policy-makers to facilitate improved organizational adaptive-capacity, through the
mechanisms of RRS: (a) adaptive-capacity is sensitive to initial conditions, emerging and
evolving from cooperative and defective strategic decisions in the evolutionary- RRSA
PD; (b) RRSA as an effective framework for climate negotiations does not substitute topdown decision making with a polycentric bottom-up approach, but rather facilitates
bottom-up processes using top-down implementation with a distinction between the latter
and central control; (c) defection and improved adaptive-capacity within the context of
climate change are not mutually exclusive; (d) RRSA climate negotiations and defection
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are not mutually exclusive; (e) RRSA climate negotiations are sensitive to initial
conditions; (f) improved RRSA does not necessarily involve collective coordination or
control but rather emerges and evolves as a result of the initial conditions specified for
the evolutionary-RRSA PD; and (g) RRSA climate negotiations consisting of
combinations of mutual-cooperation (C, C) with defection against a cooperator (D, C),
and cooperation against a defector (C, D) can lead to maximization of payoffs to selfinterested parties while maintaining the goal of increasing adaptive-capacity to climate
change using the evolutionary-RRSA PD.
Evolutionary RRSA Management Framework
Using the seven deductions discussed above, the cyclical 4-phased RRSA
management framework was developed, as shown in Figure A50. Beginning at Phase 1,
the evolutionary RRSA management framework uses the outputs from Phase 1 as inputs
to Phase 2, followed by top-down implementation of the outputs of Phase 2, evaluation,
and a return to Phase 1. The evolutionary RRSA management framework cycles through
all 4 Phases incrementally thereby increasing adaptive-capacity with each cycle.
Phase 1. Phase 1 of the RRSA management framework constitutes an emissions
audit. Analysis of organizational consumption and production patterns should be
conducted to ascertain as-is parameters. The key performance indicator from Phase 1 is
the emissions-score consisting of the sum of GHG consumption and production
emissions.
Phase 2. Phase 2 calls for the use of the RRSA management framework
simulation tool. The emissions-score from the audit conducted in Phase 1 serves as the
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initial-emissions-score, should be plugged into the simulation, using the evolutionaryRRSA simulation tool to calibrate to-be parameters. Managers, leaders, and policy
developers are encouraged to use the tool to test initial conditions until desired outcomes
are simulated. The calibration of to-be parameters will produce the emissions-target,
emissions-penalty, fitness, and emissions-allowance. Organizational adaptive-capacity is
calibrated in Phase 2 via the mechanisms of resilience, robustness, and sustainability.
Phase 3. Phase 3 of the RRSA management framework involves top-down
implementation of the initial conditions produced from Phase 2. In other words, Phase 3
involves ensuring that the emissions-target, emissions-penalty, and emissions-allowance
are set and clearly communicated to the rest of the organization or bodies under
governance. Key performance indicators for this phase, including adaptive-capacity,
resilience, robustness, and sustainability, should be benchmarked against the to-be
simulation parameters acquired in Phase 2.
Phase 4. Phase 4 involves evaluation of the current emissions-score. As such
Phase 4 triggers a return to Phase 1, in which an emissions audit is conducted. The 4phase RRSA framework should be viewed as a cyclical management approach to
reducing consumption and production of GHGs by implementing appropriate initial
conditions through the use of the simulation tool.
Limitations of the Study
In Chapter 1, I referred to the abstract nature of ABMS as a limitation of this
study; however, experimental execution proved that the abstraction of ABMS allowed for
the refinement of those parameters that were necessary for generating relevant and
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necessary data while tuning out the noise. The NP-hard and intractable threats to
generalizability associated with ABMS were mitigated by setting stop conditions in the
model and in the experiments run in BehaviorSpace. Generative postnormal science
studies using ABMS are empirical and therefore highly generalizable for decisionmaking and problem solving (Epstein, 1999).
Grounding the quantitative definitions of all variables in the relevant game theory
and complexity theory literatures ensured external validity. Regarding conclusion
validity, all statistical analyses were conducted using a 95% confidence interval with the
goal of maximizing the R2 and F statistics, while minimizing the p values of all
covariates, thereby providing accurate and reliable statistical power. The generated data
were tested for violation of normality, homoscedasticity, and serial independence using
optimization of the SSR statistic for the best-fit curve and application of a Lagrange
multiplier technique (Jarque & Bera, 1980). Moreover, at any given Run, the well-mixed
heterogeneous random sampling of the entire population to represent groups eliminates
systematic bias and ensures high external validity. This study was not time bounded, and
the findings from ABMS are highly generalizable.
Recommendations
The data generated for this study from Runs 1, 2, and 3 for all types of strategies
did not include the effect of a cooperation reward. Further research is required to test the
relationship between RRS and adaptive-capacity with the application of a cooperationreward. The hypothesis was that the cooperation-reward will result in greater positive
correlation between the covariates and adaptive-capacity. A future study using the model
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developed for this study with the cooperation-reward parameter included, in combination
with statistical modeling to test the relationship between variables, is recommended for
further research in the field of information systems.
Potential for further research in the field of applied complexity using the model
created for this study is possible by examining the behavior between agents and
analyzing the complexity of their interactions and information processing abilities. The
model is currently written to simulate strategies using PD PGG for climate governance;
however, the parameters may be modified to test the strategies for other types of PGG
problems, such arms races, nuclear power contractual agreements, water restrictions, and
so forth. Having developed the methodology for this study, modification of parameters in
the model to facilitate the research questions associated with the PD PGG scenarios
herein mentioned would carry with it the strengths of the current study.
Implications
In current literature, the lack of progress thus far made in climate negotiations was
attributed to a need for a bottom-up polycentric approach to climate change policy in lieu
of monocentric top-down decision-making (Cole, 2015). The RRSA framework for
climate negotiations developed in this study facilitates the bottom-up processes using topdown implementation by climate governance leaders and decision-makers, thereby
emphasizing the distinctions between central control or coordination of cooperation and
top-down implementation of the evolutionary RRSA management framework, as shown
in Figure A50, which is devoid of central control but facilitates the emergence of
increased adaptive-capacity to climate change. Ostrom (1990) attributed the shortfall of
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progress in climate negotiations to the lack of time needed for mutual trust to develop
between individuals for mutually beneficial transactions such as climate change
negotiations. However, the ABMS methodology used in this study employed the use of
autonomous agents in the absence of trust or friendship, which emphasized instead the
need for extended interaction to solidify positive and beneficial negotiations between
players. Trust is not a requirement for mutual altruism in game theory (Axelrod, 1984)
nor is it a requirement for increased adaptive-capacity to emerge using the evolutionaryRRSA PD, which has implications for the responsible use of the US $100 billion of
climate financing pledged in Copenhagen (COP15) expiring in 2020, which is a
conflicting source of consensus and controversy in UNFCCC adaptation negotiations
underscored by the adaptation debt, framed by the competing norms of adaptation
restitution and adaptation development.
While Cole (2015) highlighted the role of private actors in polycentric governance
initiatives, citing the formation of the WBCSD in 1992 as an example, the evolutionaryRRSA PD showed that increased adaptive-capacity emerges from bottom-up processes or
exchanges in negotiations. These negotiations might occur at any level of organization,
including leaders, and business, private, transnational, or governmental decision-makers
and players. Thus, the RRSA framework for climate negotiations herein developed can be
used to develop business solutions that contribute to mitigating a 2° C rise in global
temperatures by 2050.
While Bulkeley and Newell (2015) proposed that treating climate change as an
international or global problem evokes the tragedy of the commons problem in which no
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actor or institution has control of the atmosphere as a common resource, the RRSA
framework for climate negotiations emphasizes the distinction between top-down
implementation and central control. The GHG producing processes engrained in
everyday production and consumption patterns constitute the bottom-up processes that
underscore the emissions-score, emissions-target, and net emissions of agents in the
evolutionary-RRSA PD, which evolve to produce increased adaptive-capacity despite the
lack of central control. The question raised by Bulkeley and Newell as to what the role of
nation-states are in solving the climate change problem was herein addressed as the role
of implementation of the RRSA framework for climate negotiations to provide the
necessary initial conditions for increased adaptive-capacity to emerge.
Conclusions
Climate change leaders, negotiators, decision-makers, and participants are advised
to understand the distinction between top-down implementation of the cyclical 4-Phase
evolutionary RRSA management framework, as shown in Figure A50 herein developed,
and central control. The evolutionary RRSA management framework for climate
negotiations uses the evolutionary-RRSA PD as a management tool, which is devoid of
central control, but when implemented by leaders, provides an incubator for the initialconditions necessary for increased adaptive-capacity to climate change as a result of
bottom-up processes. In conclusion, the cyclical 4-Phase evolutionary RRSA
management framework for climate negotiations, consisting of the 4 Phases presented
above, provides climate governing bodies with the tools to create the necessary initial
conditions for PGG participants, while acting for their own self-interests, to participate in
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the greatest and most complex of all public goods games with the highest stakes, which
leads to emergence and evolution of resilience, robustness, sustainability, and increased
adaptive-capacity to mitigate the catastrophes and disasters of climate change discussed
in Chapter 2, by using the evolutionary-RRSA PD management tool that includes both
cooperation and defection, because their payoffs will be maximized.
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures
Table A1
Discrepancies Between Planned Model and Actual Model
Planned model

Actual model

Existing basic evolutionary PD model

New evolutionary PD model for adaptive
capacity

Infinite sample size, sampled randomly
using ODE approach to determine
proportion of breeds.

Finite sample size, sampled using random
sampling and sliding proportion of breeds.

Random proportion Q = 1/ N removed
from the population at each time step.

Organizations eliminated using a GA,
based on fitness.
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Table A2
Types of Strategies Played by Agent Breeds for PD Simulation Games

Figure A1. Graph of the logistic map with X = fraction of carrying capacity, and r =
combined effect of birth rate and death rate. Retrieved from Mitchell (2009).
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Table A3
Evolutionary-RRSA PD Experiment for RRS - Run 1

Figure A2. y = f (x1) – Run 1
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Figure A3. y = f (x2) – Run 1

Figure A4. y = f (x3) – Run 1
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Figure A5. Adaptive-capacity vs time for the evolutionary-RRSA PD – Run 1
Table A4
Evolutionary-RRSA PD Experiment for RRS –Run 2
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Figure A6. y = f (x1) - Run 2

Figure A7. y = f (x2) - Run 2
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Figure A8. y = f (x3) - Run 2

Figure A9. Adaptive-capacity vs time - Run 2
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Table A5
Evolutionary-RRSA PD Experiment for RRS –Run 3

Figure A10. y = f (x1) - Run 3
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Figure A11. y = f (x2);Run 3

Figure A12. y = f (x3) - Run 3

179

Figure A13. Adaptive-capacity vs time - Run 3
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Table A6
Evolutionary-TfT PD Experiment for RRS –Run 1
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Figure A14. y = f (x1) - Run 1

Figure A15. y = f (x2) - Run 1
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Figure A16. y = f (x3) - Run 1

Figure A17. Adaptive-capacity vs time - Run 1
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Table A7
Evolutionary-TfT PD Experiment for RRS –Run 2
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Figure A18. y = f (x1) - Run 2

Figure A19. y = f (x2) - Run 2
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Figure A20. y = f (x3) - Run 2

Figure A21. Adaptive-capacity vs time - Run 2
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Table A8
Evolutionary-TfT PD Experiment for RRS –Run 3

Figure A22. y = f (x1) - Run 3
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Figure A23. y = f (x2) - Run 3

Figure A24. y = f (x3) - Run 3
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Figure A25. Adaptive-capacity vs time - Run 3
Table A9
Repeated-Cooperate PD Experiment for RRS –Run 1
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Figure A26. y = f (x1) - Run 1

Figure A27. y = f (x2) - Run 1

Figure A28. y = f (x3) - Run 1
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Figure A29. Adaptive-capacity vs time - Run 1
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Table A10
Repeated-Cooperate PD Experiment for RRS –Run 2

Figure A30. y = f (x1) - Run 2
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Figure A31. y = f (x2) - Run 2

Figure A32. y = f (x3) - Run 2
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Figure A33. Adaptive-capacity vs time - Run 2
Table A11
Repeated-Cooperate PD Experiment for RRS –Run 3
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Figure A34. y = f (x1) - Run 3

Figure A35. y = f (x2) - Run 3
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Figure A36. y = f (x3) - Run 3

Figure A37. Adaptive-capacity vs time - Run 3
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Table A12
Repeated-Defect PD Experiment for RRS –Run 1

Figure A38. y = f (x1) - Run 1
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Figure A39. y = f (x2) - Run 1

Figure A40. y = f (x3) - Run 1
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Figure A41. Adaptive-capacity vs time - Run 1
Table A13
Repeated-defect PD Experiment for RRS –Run 2
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Figure A42. y = f (x1) - Run 2

Figure A43. y = f (x2) - Run 2
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Figure A44. y = f (x3) - Run 2

Figure A45. Adaptive-capacity vs time - Run 2
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Table A14
Repeated-Defect PD Experiment for RRS –Run 3

Figure A46. y = f (x1) - Run 3
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Figure A47. y = f (x2) - Run 3

Figure A48. y = f (x3) - Run 3
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Figure A49. Adaptive-capacity vs time - Run 3
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Figure A50. Evolutionary-RRSA Management Framework

